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Cash-Plus: Variants and Components of Transfer-Based Anti-Poverty Programming

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Can extensions such as coaching and training augment the poverty relief effects of cash transfers, or do they unnecessarily constrain the agency of recipients in the allocation of program resources? We use a randomized trial to estimate the impacts of philosophically distinct variants of transfer-based poverty reduction approaches in rural Uganda. One is a microenterprise intervention in the spirit of so-called graduation programming that provides beneficiaries with an integrated package of cash transfers, coaching, and training on sustainable livelihoods; the other variant monetizes the cost of coaching and training so as to more than double the size of cash transfers. We also we evaluate the merits of more marginal individual extension components, involving savings group formation in the microenterprise variant and light-touch behavioral intervention (involving goal-setting and plan-making) in the cash variant. Overall, we build confidence that investing program resources in productive extensions can expand poverty reduction. We gain elevated confidence in the impacts and cost-effectiveness of the fully integrated microenterprise intervention.

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INTRODUCTION

Motivation

Diverse development interventions, including so-called "ultra-poor graduation" programs, provide an integrated package of intangibles (in the form of training and mentoring) on top of tangibles (such as livestock assets, lump sum transfers, and consumption stipends) to poor people in low-income countries in an attempt to help them establish and grow microenterprises. Randomized evaluations have demonstrated improvements in key markers of poverty among poor sub-populations in low-income countries, which appear to hold across contexts and in the long run (Bandiera et al., 2013; Banerjee, Duflo, et al., 2015; Banerjee, Duflo, Chattopadhyay, & Shapiro, 2016; Blattman et al., 2016).

These interventions come with a degree of paternalism: implicit in the design is the assumption that the poor are not in a position to allocate capital optimally on their own and that investing a portion of available program resources in training and mentoring on their behalf yields superior outcomes. The justification might be accommodated within a traditional economic framework (say, involving failures in the markets for human capital or information) as well as a behavioral framework (say, involving time inconsistency, attention constraints, or downcast mindsets in the target population). But skeptics may point to evaluations of plain unconditional cash transfers as an alternative that leaves maximum agency with beneficiaries and has equally demonstrated diverse encouraging effects on markers of economic development (Baird, McIntosh, & Özler, 2011; Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016).

What are the consequences of stripping livelihood programs of some – or all – of their constituent components? Are some components especially critical? This question is obviously relevant to development policy from a static cost-effectiveness perspective, but it is also important from a more dynamic perspective of delivery science. Skeptics of the use of randomized evaluations in evidence-based policy argue that generalizing from past evaluation results calls for an awareness of the factors that

moderated the effects in the original settings, and of their role in the new and different settings (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Deaton, 2010). One such factor might be the quality of implementation; if it correlates negatively with the scale of implementation, pilot settings tend to yield inadequately optimistic policy predictions (Bold, Kimenyi, Mwabu, Ng'ang'a, & Sandefur, 2013; Pritchett & Sandefur, 2013). In light of such concerns, a reduction in the complexity of interventions is welcome: all else equal, a simpler intervention can be delivered with higher fidelity and tends to allow for greater abstraction from contextual detail.

This study generates evidence on the impacts of a less intensive variant of (ordinarily multi-year) graduation programming and evaluates it in a further simplified form by stripping out training on savings group formation. It also approaches a point of minimal complexity, testing if the program performs any better than it would if it was monetized and provided in the form of unconditional cash transfers. It also slightly expands on these transfers by delivering a behavioral intervention that attempts to administer the active psychological ingredients of the microenterprise program in distilled form at low cost and with minimal constraints on participant agency.

Context

Village Enterprise is a nonprofit organization that implements microenterprise programming in Uganda and Kenya. Its core program has parallels to the interventions studied in Banerjee et al. (2015) in that it uses a participatory targeting process as well as a proxy means test to identify the poorest households and then provides one of their representatives with a combination of transfers, mentorship, and training. However, it has a number of distinguishing features.

First, the program is relatively short in duration, with training sessions taking four months and mentorship engagement taking nine months and the overall program concluding within a year. The trainings of Village Enterprise are fairly focused on savings group formation and microenterprise administration; they do not include modules included in diverse other integrated development programs, such as nutrition,

hygiene, family planning, child rearing, or literacy. (That said, the program does include a training session on environmental conservation that is not widespread in other poverty relief programs.)

Second, the program relies on group formation not only for the establishment of savings associations, but also the establishment of microenterprises. Businesses are comprised of a target of three households whose representatives are encouraged to establish their activities in partnership, and who receive cash transfers jointly.

Third, the transfer component is delivered in not in the form of assets, but cash. It involves two instalments, both of which are made directly to the business unit. The second instalment is made only if the business demonstrates that the first instalment was invested in in the group business. No consumption stipend is provided.

Being less comprehensive and shorter in duration, the Village Enterprise program comes at roughly a third of the cost (in USD PPP terms) of the least costly graduation program evaluated in Banerjee et al. (2015).

Research Framework

We set out to address a number of questions, which can be broadly categorized as pertaining to the microenterprise program variant of Village Enterprise or pertaining to a philosophically distinct program variant that strips out training and mentorship components so as to leave expanded agency in the investment decision to participants.

With regards to the former: What is the impact of the microenterprise intervention in the short- and medium run? Based on comparable programs (Bandiera et al., 2013; Banerjee, Duflo, et al., 2015), we expected that the program would orient the productive activities of poor households towards microenterprise administration and lead to improved markers of objective economic well-being (consumption, assets, income) as well as subjective well-being. Also, what is the impact of the savings

group component in the microenterprise program? As described in the chapter on intervention design, Village Enterprise invests substantial training efforts in the establishment of so-called Business Savings Groups that are meant to provide basic deposit and loan functions. Evidence on such interventions is mixed, with meta-reviews of randomized trials suggesting some but not transformational impacts (Gash & Odell, 2013; Karlan, Savonitto, Thuysbaert, & Udry, 2017). We expected that this component would alter measures of financial inclusion but not alter economic trajectories (i.e., poverty outcomes such as consumption, assets, or incomes).

With regards to the cash transfer program: what is the impact of removing costly training and mentorship components and using the surplus to expand the size of cash transfers – both in absolute terms, and relative to the microenterprise program variant? There is experimental evidence on both microenterprise and cash transfer programs but little to no evidence to compare them in a given setting (Sulaiman, Goldberg, Karlan, & de Montesquiou, 2016). Based on our interpretation of relevant literature (Fafchamps, McKenzie, Quinn, & Woodruff, 2012) and the fact that the second transfer in the microenterprise program was conditional on the productive investment of the first, we anticipated that the microenterprise program would lead to higher investment in productive assets, which in turn would lead to lower short-term consumption but higher long-term consumption. We hypothesized that a behavioral intervention might change these patterns and align the effects of cash transfers more closely with those of the microenterprise program. It has already been demonstrated that simple nudges, such as framing exercises, can alter the investment decisions of cash transfer recipients (Benhassine, Devoto, Duflo, Dupas, & Pouliquen, 2015); our behavioral intervention differs in that it explicitly encourages recipients to exercise agency in the investment decisions.

At the time of trial registration, we envisioned the exploration of further research questions for which data was not ultimately collected. Meanwhile, new measures were added. See publicly archived surveys, data, and code for details.

STUDY DESIGN

Sampling and Assignment

Two regions were selected for the study – one in Western Uganda (Hoima district) and another in Eastern Uganda (Amuria, Katakwi, and Ngora districts). In each region, 69 villages were identified that qualified as large enough for the study, meaning that an initial mapping exercise indicated that at least 70 participant households would qualify for the Village Enterprise program.

In each of these villages, Village Enterprise independently conducted a participatory wealth ranking exercise, followed by a quantitative means test using simple progress-out-of-poverty (PPI) survey data, to determine eligibility. Self-selected representatives were identified for each household. The resulting list was shared with the research team for randomization.

Three equally sized cohorts of 23 villages each were formed in each region. As displayed in *Figure 1*, implementation was staggered by cohort.

As displayed in *Figure 2*, villages within each cohort were assigned at random to one of five arms, labeled A-E; and eligible participants within each village were further randomly allocated to sub-arms. Specifically: In A-type villages, 30 households were assigned to controls (sub-arm A1) and 35 to the microenterprise program (A2). A further 5 households were assigned to a training module used for operational research. In B-type villages, 30 households were assigned to controls (B1) and 35 to a variant of the microenterprise program excluding the savings group components (B2). Here too, a further 5 households were assigned to operational research. In C-type villages, 30 households were assigned to controls (C1) and 35 to a variant of the microenterprise program called business-in-a-box that Village Enterprise opted to evaluate for operational research purposes (C2). In D-type villages, 14 households were assigned to within-village controls (D1); 7 were to plain cash transfers (D2); and 7 were to behavioral cash transfers (D3). In E-type villages, 30 households were assigned to controls (E1). *Figure 3* displays the geographic distribution of arms by region.

Following the randomization, a baseline survey team was provided with a list of intended study invitees. Neither enumerators not invited respondents were acquainted with the intended treatment assignment, so participants' decisions to accept with the invitation and participate in the research study was independent of the randomization. Participants who opted to participate in the survey were formally recruited into the study.

Intervention Design

The standard microenterprise program (sub-arm A2) was the routine program of Village Enterprise, composed of training, transfers, and mentorship. All trainings were administered by a dedicated intervention leader. The training component constituted sixteen sessions, each of which took one to three hours. Of these, the first was an introduction to the program. Another session involved the formation of so-called business groups that would initiate their microenterprises as partnerships (targeted group size: 3 household representatives). Six sessions dealt with savings and the formation, functioning, and governance of so-called business savings groups (targeted group size: 30 household representatives). Seven sessions dealt with microenterprise administration (e.g., business selection, business planning, record-keeping, and livestock management); and one dealt with conservation. The total duration of the training was approximately 4 months. Several training sessions into the program, a lump sum cash transfer of nominal UGX 240k[1] was made to each business (amounting to UGX 80k per household, or USD 79 in constant 2016 PPP terms), contingent upon approval of a business plan. The second transfer (at half the initial amount) was made upon a progress report approximately seven months later, contingent on a review that investments of the initial seed capital had been invested in business activities and that the group was still operating. The average transfer date, weighted by the transfer amounts, was August 2014 (i.e., 15 months before the first and 27 months before the second follow-up survey). Mentorship visits initiated after the first transfer and continued at a monthly frequency. The direct programmatic cost of the microenterprise program (including country-level indirect costs such as local office and field

management) was budgeted at USD 140 (USD 362 in constant 2016 USD PPP terms). In the context of the trial, actual costs ended up exceeding budget numbers (see discussion chapter).

Sub-arm B2 was a variant of the microenterprise that excluded the six training sessions on savings and the formation of Business Savings Groups. Village-level groups with a representative were still formed for the purpose of establishing an administrative counterpart for Village Enterprise.

Sub-arm D2 involved only unconditional cash transfers. Unlike in the microenterprise program variants, payments were provided not to three-member businesses but to individual households directly. Eligible ones were presented with a voucher and given a time and date when they could expect initial cash disbursements. Intervention leaders explained that a nonprofit had decided to disburse cash for people in the region that they could use as they pleased. The cash disbursement was made in a central village location, with an initial lump sum transfer of UGX 208k (USD 206 in constant 2016 USD PPP terms) per household, followed by a second transfer at half the initial amount. The timing of the two payments mirrored that of the microenterprise program variant. The amounts were budgeted in the planning stage as equivalent to the direct cost of the microenterprise program, minus the lowest share of non-transfer costs that was identified in the benchmarking of independent cash transfer delivery initiatives (i.e., 7.4%).

Sub-arm D3 expanded upon the cash transfers described in sub-arm D2 using a light-touch behavioral intervention. There are indications that targeting the perceived opportunity sets of the poor can have economic impacts (Bernard, Dercon, Orkin, & Taffesse, 2014). The addressing of such "internal" constraints may be especially impactful at times when development interventions overcome "external" constraints (Lybbert & Wydick 2016). Indeed, transfer-based development interventions that involved business planning have demonstrated remarkable poverty alleviation effects (Blattman, Fiala, & Martinez, 2014). The behavioral intervention was an attempt to distill attempted to distill relevant literature and evaluate the incremental impact of goal-setting, plan-making, and complementary psychological approaches in a cash transfer program. The intervention included three sessions, which included (a) an

introductory discussion alongside the voucher provision (35 minutes); (b) a workshop surrounding the first cash disbursement (145 minutes); and a meeting surrounding the second disbursement (30 minutes). Goal setting and plan-making components were derived from literature on mental contrasting and implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999; Oettingen, 2000). Participants also completed self-affirmation exercises to address some of the stigma of poverty and to promote the belief that their goals were achievable (Hall, Zhao, & Shafir, 2014). Participants were asked to think about peers who had been successful, and about ways that they could follow their peers' examples. This was motivated by work on role models (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997) as well as other work on the power of social norms (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) and social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954). Participants also completed drawings and created slogans to help remind them of their goals (Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, & Zinman, 2010; Rogers & Milkman, 2016). Finally, the program included a mental accounting exercise (Thaler, 1999). The first transfer was provided in two envelopes, with one (amounting to UGX 188k) labeled as intended to support the goal, and the other (UGX 20k) labeled as intended for personal incidentals. This was meant to encourage participants to draw a clear line between personal consumption and goal pursuit.

The intervention scripts can be found among the online supplementary materials.

Data Collection

The study builds on three household surveys: one baseline and two follow-up surveys (labeled midline and endline). Their relative timing is displayed in *Figure 1*.

At the outset of the study, the outcome variables perceived as most central to the theory of change were key poverty indicators (i.e., per-capita consumption, income, and assets); the structure of financial positions (i.e., savings and debt); the employment status of household members; and the subjective well-being of the respondent. However, diverse further measures on nutrition, education, health, decision-making; cognitive performance; and community life were also of interest.

Over the course of the evaluation, some measurement decisions were updated. Diverse psychological and community related measures (e.g., self-control, pride, aspirations, expectations, trust, intimate partner violence) were added to the follow-up surveys. In these follow-up surveys, income and asset measures were collected in updated manner (specifically, collected separately for households and businesses, whereas previously they had been pooled). Cognitive baseline measurement was not successful in the first cohort, and cognitive data collection was abandoned after the baseline. The available data can be gleaned from the survey forms, data sets, and code, all of which are publicly archived except as noted in the *Online Appendix on Data and Measures*.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

Note that different treatment arms had different resources at their disposal; microenterprise programming had access to fairly unrestricted implementation funds while cash transfer programming required dedicated research funds. Further, the evaluation aimed to serve not only scientific but also operational purposes; some insights (e.g., on the impact of removing savings modules from the microenterprise program) were expected to be directly actionable, while others (e.g., on the impact of adding a psychological intervention to a cash transfer arm) were further removed from the current program. The variations in resources and objectives across arms and sub-arms explain the heterogeneity in sample sizes and statistical power conditions. We approached the research opportunity with elevated expectations in the learning potential on some questions and lower expectations in the potential of others. (Only sub-arms C2, A3, and B3 were deemed too underpowered to serve any scientific purposes and were identified from the outset as serving only operational purposes.)

Strategy for Poverty Outcomes

A Bayesian spirit is also reflected in the analysis of poverty outcomes (i.e., consumption, income, and assets). Here, point estimates are directly relevant for cost-effectiveness assessments; yet simultaneously, the data provides ample room for the analysis to drift towards analytical choices that deliver compelling,

harmonious, or otherwise welcome results. To curb this concern—and in an exploration of alternatives to pre-analysis plans, which come with costs (Olken, 2015), especially to less experienced researchers—we start by laying out a universe of plausible results before deriving inferences from this universe. We start this process with the classification of important "choice dimensions" in the analysis.

For illustration purposes, consider the following model:

(I) $$y_{ijF} = \alpha_j + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

Here, y_{ijF} is the per-capita outcome in household i in village cluster j at the time of follow-up F; T is the randomized assignment, coded to 1 for intent-to-treat and to 0 for the counterfactual; y_{ijB} is the baseline observation of the outcome; and X_{ijB} is a set of socioeconomic baseline covariates. The coefficient for the intent-to-treat estimate is β.

'Tests' are defined as alternative combinations of outcomes y and treatment assignments T. Each test has a substantively different interpretation. Choice dimensions here include the following:

(1) **Definition of outcomes**. In defining poverty outcome y, we present each of the three primary financial outcomes (consumption, assets, and income) in the form of one total composite as well as three sub-composites.

(2) **Definition of outcome rounds**. We define alternative follow-ups F as the first follow-up (midline); the second follow-up (endline); and, following McKenzie (2012), a pooled average value.

(3) **Definition of comparisons**. In defining T, we evaluate six comparisons:

[a] the impact of the microenterprise programs by comparing A2∪B2 to untreated controls;

[b] the impact of the cash transfer programs by comparing D2∪D3 to untreated controls;

[c] the impact of the microenterprise programs variants relative to the cash transfer programs by comparing A2∪B2 to D2∪D3;

[d] the impact of the savings group component, conditional on the microenterprise program variant, by comparing A2 to B2;

[e] the impact of the behavioral intervention component when added to the cash transfer program variant, by comparing D3 to D2; and

[f] spillovers by comparing A1∪B1∪C1∪D1 to E1.

The above implies 12×3×6 = 216 alternative tests with substantively different interpretations. For each test, there are numerous plausible specification alternatives that may change results but not their substantive interpretation. Some choice dimensions involve those made in course of model selection, e.g.:

(1) **Use of baseline values**. The aforementioned model, which controls for the baseline measure y_B, is not the only plausible approach. Alternatively, one might subtract baseline data from follow-up data and estimate differences in differences, or leave it out of the estimation process altogether.

(2) **Use of socioeconomic covariates**. The available selection of measures to populate set X_{ijB} is large, but the choice can be reduced to 'selecting none' or 'selecting some set'. One plausible set might involve five socioeconomic baseline characteristics, selected using a selection algorithm such as least angle regression (Efron et al., 2004).

(3) **Use of fixed effects**. The term α_j implies the use of cluster fixed effects. A plausible alternative would be to define α as a constant.

Other choice dimensions relate to the operationalization of variables from the data, e.g.:

(1) **Outlier adjustment**. As the data set is not cleared of outliers and poverty measures are sensitive to them, some adjustment is required. To avoid introducing an attenuating bias, it is most sensible to adjust each combination of y and T separately. But there is discretion in the appropriate level – for instance, one might recode the highest and lowest 0.5%, 2.5%, or 5% of observations to the cutoff value (i.e., winsorize at the 99%, 95%, or 90% level).

(2) **Definition of controls.** As defined above, comparisons [a] and [b] compare a treatment group with controls. But there are different plausible definition of control sets: one might code treatment assignment T to the value zero for those sets of controls [i] within treatment villages only (A1∪B1 and D1, respectively); [ii] for those in control villages only (i.e., E1); or [iii] for all available controls (i.e., A1∪B1∪C1∪D1∪E1). These choices come with different merits: electing between-village comparisons would circumvent adjustments for cluster robustness, with benefits for statistical power, and selecting only control villages would minimize susceptibility to possible bias emerging from within-village spillovers. The third option, involving the simultaneous use of all available counterfactuals, is a compromise between power and unbiasedness. An appropriate assessment of trade-offs is difficult without data.

(3) **Valuation approach**. Where the computation of y involves calculating the value of goods, one might use the price estimates reported by respondents; the median prices in a regional geographic unit; or a combination that uses the former where available and the latter where respondents are unsure.

Multiplying the 216 tests with 2×3×2 alternative models and 3×3×3 alternative operationalizations would yield a total of 69,984 combinations.

Note that not every specification choice is applicable for every test. First, a choice of three alternative counterfactuals is only available for comparison sets [a] and [b], but not for comparison sets [c], [d], [e], and [f]; this removes 8/18 of conceivable estimates. Second, the choice of whether or not to use cluster fixed effects is only applicable for comparisons within arms, where the unit of randomization as well as the unit of observation is the household (i.e., in comparison sets [a-i], [b-ii], and [e], which we label "non-clustered comparisons"). Cluster fixed effects would be collinear with the unit of randomization this is itself the cluster (i.e., in comparison sets [a-ii], [a-iii], [b-ii], [b-iii], [c], [d], and [f]; we label these "clustered comparisons"); this removes 7/20 of conceivable estimates. Third, the use of any valuation other than the respondent's is only appropriate for measures with commodity character (removing 1/3 of

conceivable estimates). This leaves the number of actual estimates at 16,848, i.e., an average of 78 specifications for each of the 216 tests on average.

To further limit the number of applicable specifications, we address the challenge of model selection. We employ the Bayesian model averaging (Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, & Volinsky, 1999) to calculate posterior model probabilities for each of the 16,848 estimates, then select the model that across all tests has the strongest average support from the data. More specifically, we aim to extract one model to be used for non-clustered comparisons, and another for clustered comparisons; as discussed, these call for different statistical procedures.

Third, we discuss operationalization choices. Without pre-specification nor a standardized selection mechanism, this step involves elevated discretion. To ground it in a transparent process, we build on Simonsohn, Simmons, & Nelson (2015) by developing "specification curves" that visually present the results of a universe of plausible specifications behind a given test.

We are left with 216 preferred estimates: 36 intent-to-treat coefficients and associated p values (i.e., one for each of the 12 outcomes and three follow-up rounds) across six comparison groups. To account for multiple inference, we control for the false discovery rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995), reporting minimum q values following the method used in Anderson (2008). We apply these adjustments across all estimates within a given comparison group, but not across comparison groups, as these investigate separate hypotheses.

Strategy for Other Outcomes

For other outcomes, we present two specifications. The first is the most basic regression specification; the second is the aforementioned preferred specification. The preferred specification is derived from the aforementioned model selection process for poverty outcomes, but does not feed back into this process. We wish to limiting such interdependence to avoid a scenario where the estimates that serve as inputs for cost-effectiveness calculations might be tipped by more exploratory analyses.

We apply specifications 1 and 2 to all measures including individual level and binary outcomes. The latter are transformed through the use of logistic regression, and estimates are presented as odds ratios.

RESULTS

Balance Checks, Participant Flow, and Attrition

Table 1 presents balance checks on the baseline measures that are subsequently considered as covariates in applicable specifications. Treatment and control sub-arms are well balanced, with no significant differences emerging on any baseline measure.

Element (1) of *Table 2* displays the assignments that were presented in the *Sampling and Assignment* chapter and depicted in *Figure 2*. As discussed, only participants who had been successfully baselined were recruited into the study. Of the resulting study population, follow-ups were successful with 93% and 91% of respondents in the two respective follow-up surveys.

As some heterogeneity in attrition rates across arms is apparent in *Table 2*, a significance test is presented in *Table 3*. Indeed, some comparison sets are afflicted by differential attrition between treatment and control sub-arms; for these, we will follow the trimming procedures proposed by Lee (2009) in order to put bounds on the treatment effects, repeating the trimming procedures individually for each test. This procedure will be limited to poverty outcomes.

Specification Selection

As discussed, the specification process involves model selection and variable operationalization.

We start the model selection process by assigning equal prior probabilities to each model within each test; calculating the Bayesian information criterion for each of the 16,848 estimates; and using these inputs to calculate approximate posterior probabilities for each model (Clyde, 2003; Hoeting et al., 1999). Averaging these across tests, we find the posterior model probabilities presented in *Figure 4*. This

prescribes the use of the baseline measure of the outcome in question as a covariate, alongside a set of socioeconomic baseline covariates; also, it prescribes the use of cluster fixed effects. In other words, the full equation presented in (I) is validated as the preferred model for non-clustered comparisons. In the case of clustered comparisons, fixed effects are replaced by a constant and standard errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

To select operationalizations, we consult the specification curves. It appears (e.g. in *Figure 17*) that 99% winsorization leaves questionable data points in place, but there is no discernible case for winsorizing below the 95% level.

Another decision challenge pertains to the appropriate choice of the counterfactuals in comparisons [a] and [b]. In the aggregate, evidence of spillovers is limited (see *Figures 10, 16,* and *22*, as well as all pertinent tables). However, there are signs that spillovers differ by arm: as shown in *Figures 6, 12,* and *18,* the impact estimates for the cash transfer program are highly sensitive to the choice of counterfactual – unlike those for the microenterprise program (*Figures 5, 11,* and *17*). As negative spillovers appear pronounced in cash transfer villages, limiting the counterfactual to within-village controls would tend to differentially inflate the impact estimates for the cash arm and lead to bias in direct comparisons with the microenterprise arms. A shared counterfactual is needed, and the use of all available controls [iii] achieves this without excessively damaging power.

The specification curves provide fewer clues about the importance of valuation rules. To select that choice which is most representative of all specifications, we generate mean standardized effects for each test, subtract these from all individual estimates to generate error terms, and select the valuation and outlier correction that minimizes squared errors. This prescribes that we value all commodities using local median prices by region and wave.

The above process leaves with a single preferred specification rule, resulting in 216 estimates for poverty outcomes (36 per test); these are presented in *Tables 4-9* (one table per comparison). The degree of

significance will define our tone: where estimates are only individually significant, we will speak of "indications"; where they withstand multiple inference adjustments, we speak of "evidence".

Impacts of Microenterprise Program

Table 4 shows evidence on annual consumption impacts of UGX 26k per capita (USD 24 in 2016 PPP terms) when pooling across survey rounds. These appear to be driven predominantly by gains in food and beverage consumption, which is corroborated by nutritional impacts: *Table 16* demonstrates evidence of improvements in food security (i.e., a reduction in the household food insecurity access score) as well as increases in dietary diversity. No impacts emerge on other health related outcomes (*Table 40*).

There is clear evidence of gains in asset stock, estimated at UGX 16k per capita (or USD 15 in 2016 PPP units). To put this in the context of the original transfer: given an average household size of six individuals and ignoring possible measurement gaps, the initial gain in per capita asset positions as a consequence of the asset transfer had been UGX 20k per capita (or USD 20 in 2016 PPP terms) among microenterprise participants. The gains in asset stock appears to be driven predominantly by growth in livestock ownership. *Table 34* breaks household's financial position into its constituent components, so as to explore if the modesty of these effects can be explained by the netting of savings and loans. Indeed, there are indications that both increase, but in no event do the individual estimates exceed USD 2 (in 2016 PPP terms) per capita.

Income effects appear to be driven by cash inflows from self-employment activities, both in farming and other microenterprise; no significant income effects emerge from paid employment. The significance of these tendencies is reversed *Table 22*, which looks at labor allocation. A reduction in paid labor would be consistent with the conjecture that graduation-type programs disincentivize the pursuit of (presumably low-quality) opportunities to work for others (Bandiera et al., 2013). No significant effects emerge on the number of income sources, suggesting that the program neither causes significant diversification nor specialization. We do not observe meaningful impacts on schooling outcomes (*Table 28*).

Table 10 lays out other psychological outcomes. We see clear evidence of gains in subjective well-being, which unlike other primary outcomes appears to grow over time. The composite index also tends positive, driven by strong effects in perceived status. *Table 46* indicates some improvements in trust and the degree of integration people perceive with their communities.

Impacts of Cash Transfer Programs

The poverty impacts of the cash transfer program are presented in *Table 5*. Recall that comparison set [b-i] in Table 3 indicated that study participants in cash transfer groups attrited at lower rates than respondents in the control groups. *Tables 52* and *53* put bounds on the effects, using different assumptions about would-be attriters. Most discoveries are not robust to this, though the impact of the cash transfer programs on recurring consumption is consistently negative. Contrary to expectations, point estimates are not positive on any dimension of short-term consumption. (Arguably, given the short recall periods for most consumption items, very short-term consumption shocks would have remained undetected). It appears that asset stocks depreciated since the intervention, which had originally increased asset positions by UGX 35k per capita among the treated. No meaningful signals emerge on psychological and nutritional outcomes. Consistent with Banerjee, Hanna, Kreindler, & Olken (2015), the disappointing results do not appear to be driven by a disincentive among cash transfer recipients to work: in fact, we see pronounced increases in self-reported labor force participation. It appears that households used cash transfers in part to pay back loans, though in absolute terms the amounts are negligible. Some positive tendencies emerge in the domain of school attendance and enrolment.

The high response rates in the cash transfer groups also leads to differential attrition in comparison set [c], which studies the incremental impact of replacing the cash transfer program variants with the integrated microenterprise variants. Here, the relevant point estimates are presented in *Table 6*, and bounds in *Tables 54* and *55*. Poverty effects here are more robust to differential attrition than the previously discussed estimates from *Tables 52* and *53*, with the microenterprise programs performing better on both income

and consumption even when, for purposes of attrition adjustment, the poorest outcomes are trimmed in the cash transfer group.

Impacts of Savings Group Component (Conditional on Microenterprise Program Variant)

The poverty impacts of the savings group component are displayed in *Table 7*. This comparison too suffers from unequal attrition rates (see *Table 3*), and effects are reported in *Tables 56* and *57*. Indications of income gains, driven mainly by non-farm self-employment, are largely robust to differential attrition. No impacts emerge on net financial positions, not on the constituent components (*Table 37*).[2] Other outcomes provide few clues about the benefits of savings groups. Overall, we see indications that fostering the creation of savings groups can improve outcomes, though seemingly not by overcoming savings constraints. Some parallels emerge with the insights of Karlan et al. (2017), who associated savings groups with advances in microenterprise activity and in the standing of women, though in our case the indication emerges on intimate partner violence as opposed to female empowerment (*Table 49*).

Impacts of Behavioral Intervention Component (Conditional on Cash Transfer Program Variant)

Table 8 suggests that the behavioral intervention altered the investment patterns of cash transfer recipients, leading to increased livestock investments. Income from farming increases as well, and we see some indications that income from paid employment falls. *Table 32* suggests that children started working fewer hours, though no effects on schooling outcomes are discernible. We see indications of gains in subjective well-being and diverse other psychological outcomes, with a strong signal on respondents' sense of pride (*Table 14*).

DISCUSSION

This study detects no meaningful positive impacts from plain cash transfers, partly because confidence intervals are broad and partly because of point estimates on key poverty outcomes are low. Differential attrition is partly responsible for the broad confidence intervals. We are unable to provide a compelling

explanation for the level of the point estimates but can rule out that they are a result of reduced labor force participation.

Extensions appeared to allow transfer recipients to maintain their newly acquired assets at higher rates and derive more value from them over time. Labor effects do not illuminate this. To what extent was it mediated by psychological processes? This is not easily answered: nonexperimental mediation analyses are not universally accepted (Green, Ha, & Bullock, 2010), and while we were able to add an experimental arm involving psychological engagement to cash transfers, is would not have been possible to create one that "subtracts" all psychological processes from the integrated microenterprise program. However, we can observe that combining cash transfers with the light-touch behavioral intervention yielded similar patterns in terms of increasing livestock investments and subjective well-being as the integrated microenterprise intervention. The poverty effects of the behavioral intervention are ambiguous. However, as distilled behavioral interventions can be delivered relatively cheaply and in a potentially well scalable manner in the context of cash transfers, there is a clear case for further and better powered research in this domain.

In the context at hand, we gain elevated confidence in impacts of the integrated microenterprise intervention variant, which was implemented at large scale. Here, key poverty outcomes are highly significant and robust to multiple inference adjustments. Cost-effectiveness appears high: the direct programmatic cost[3] of the microenterprise program, as incurred by Village Enterprise over the course of the roll-out, amounted to USD 161 in current terms (USD 417 in 2016 PPP terms) per household. Integrating all of the organization's indirect expenses, the per-household cost was USD 251 (i.e., USD 650 in 2016 PPP terms). Given an average household size of six members, a per capita impact of USD 24 (in 2016 PPP terms) implies a payback period of 2.9 years for direct costs and 4.5 years for fully loaded costs. Accounting additionally for per capita asset stock effects of USD 15 (in 2016 PPP terms), these periods fall to 2.3 and 3.9 years, respectively. In other words, a full recovery of direct costs was plausibly achieved not far beyond the measurement period. Emerging insights on the impacts of marginal

components (both with regards to savings group formation and psychological engagement) might advance cost-effectiveness further. However, point estimates are also consistent with a possible attenuation in poverty effects over time, so we are not able to speak confidently to the sustainability of gains.

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ENDNOTES

[1] All mathematical procedures are conducted in current Ugandan shillings (UGX). Where current USD numbers and 2016 PPP USD numbers are reported, they are derived directly from UGX numbers, using UGX/USD midpoint rates from daily xe.com data for nominal rates; annual World Bank data for PPP rates; and annual December data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics for USD inflation. The effective dates and corresponding rates used in this paper are as follows:

- The outset of the project is defined as the initial trial registration date, 8 Dec 2013, with a current rate of 2,520 and a rate adjusted to constant 2016 USD PPP of 978.
- The baseline date is defined as half way through the planned survey time frame (15 March 2014), with a current rate remaining at 2,520 and a rate adjusted to constant 2016 USD PPP of 1,011.
- The intervention date is defined as the UGX-weighted average transfer date (1 Aug 2014), with a current rate of 2,613 and a rate adjusted to constant 2016 USD PPP of 1,011.
- The midline date is defined as half way through the planned midline survey time frame (15 Nov 2015), with a current rate of 3,468 and a rate adjusted to constant 2016 USD PPP of 1,067.
- The endline date is defined as half way through the planned endline survey time frame (15 Nov 2016), with a current rate of 3,556 and a rate adjusted to constant 2016 USD PPP of 1,146.
- The pooled follow-up date is defined as half way through the planned survey time frame of both mid- and endline (15 May 2015), with a current rate of 2,992 and a rate adjusted to constant 2016 USD PPP of 1,067.

[2] An alternative approach to measuring savings positions might involve consulting administrative data on balances in the savings groups established by Village Enterprise. We do not use these data, as they are only available for the sub-arm A2 where this activity was conducted. However, it should be noted that these yield significantly higher positions than self-reported ones provided by survey respondents, pointing to possible under-reporting.

[3] Direct programmatic costs included training and mentorship as well as the logistical, managerial, administrative, and monitoring costs required to implement the program, including all expenses incurred in Uganda and isolated programmatic support expenses incurred abroad. Indirect costs are defined as managerial, administrative, and fundraising expenses that did not facilitate program implementation and were incurred exclusively abroad. At the outset of the intervention, the microenterprise program including savings group formation was budgeted (based on previous experience) at a direct unit cost per household of USD 140 in current terms (USD 362 in 2016 PPP terms), of which 36% were budgeted for the transfers and 64% were budgeted for other direct programmatic expenses. Actual costs differed from budgeted costs: transfer costs were lower than budgeted because of deviations from exchange rate expectations; direct programmatic expenses were higher than budgeted, at least in part because of managerial and logistical burdens associated with the implementation of the experiment.

Cash-Plus:
Figures

September 26, 2017

List of Figures

Notes on the Interpretation of Specification Curves

Figures 5-22 display intent-to-treat statistics that emerge from different combinations of plausible analytical specifications for any given test. Tests are displayed for all of the comparison sets:

[a] The impact of the microenterprise program is estimated by defining T=1 for set A2⋃B2 and defining T=0 for three separate sets: [i] A1⋃B1; [ii] E1; and [iii] A1⋃B1⋃C1⋃D1⋃E1. Sets [i]-[iii] are displayed within the same charts.

[b] The impact of the cash transfer program is estimated by defining T=1 for set D2 and defining T=0 for three separate sets: [i] D1; [ii] E1; and [iii] A1⋃B1⋃C1⋃D1⋃E1. Sets [i]-[iii] are displayed within the same charts.

[c] The incremental impact of the microenterprise program relative to the cash transfers is estimated by defining T=1 for set A2⋃B2 and defining T=0 for set D2.

[d] The impact of the savings component (contingent on the microenterprise program variant) is estimated by defining T=1 for set A2 and defining T=0 for set B2.

[e] The impact of the behavioral intervention (contingent on the cash transfer program variant) is estimated by defining T=1 for set D3 and defining T=0 for set D2.

[f] The impact of spillovers is estimated by defining T=1 for set A1⋃B1⋃C1⋃D1 and defining T=0 for set E1.

To avoid overwhelming the reader, only resoluts total composite outcomes pooled across follow up rounds are displayed. Each figure comes with three charts:

"Specification Alternatives" Chart:
This chart highlights alternative specification details.

- Columns define specification features. A filled symbol indicates that the column feature applies, while a blank symbol indicates that it does not. Where two columns are displayed, three alternatives are available; the third column is not displayed, as it can be inferred that it applies whenever the other two do not apply.
- Column **cls** shows if the regressions adjust errors for cluster robustness. As this choice applies to all so-called clustered comparison sets [a-i], [a-ii], [b-i], [b-ii], [c], [d], and [f], and never applies to so-called non-clustered comparison sets [a-ii], [b-ii], and [e], it is not an independent choice dimension (unlike all other columns), and is included for illustration purposes only.
- For a discussion of columns **did, anc, fe,** and **ctv,** consult the footnote of Figure 4.
- The next two columns define the choice dimension of outlier adjustment. **w99** implies that 0.5% of highest and 0.5% lowest per capita outcomes are recoded to the cutoff value, and **w95** implies that 2.5% of highest and 2.5% lowest per capita outcomes are recoded to the cutoff value. Where symbols in both columns are blank, a third choice (90% winsorization) is applied.
- The next two colums define the valuation approach that is used. **own** implies that only the respondent's valuation is used; **loc** implies that regional prices (specific to the survey round) are used. Where symbols in both columns are blank, a third option is applied that uses *own* values except where these are unavailable, in which case *loc* values are used. Note that some classes of goods (such as medical expenditures or jewelry assets) are too heterogeneous to allow for a sensible unit valuation across households; for such categories, only the respondent's *own* valuation is used. When aggregated with other measures that use use another valuation rule, the latter valuation rule is displayed. See publicly archived code for further details.
- The final two columns define the choice dimension pertaining to the counterfactual selection. Note that alternatives are only applicable in comparison sets [a] and [b]. **wtn** implies a comparison within villages, and **btw** implies a between-village comparison. Where symbols in both columns are blank, a third choice applies, and all control groups (A1, B1, C1, D1, and E1) are used as the counterfactual. Note that the first choice is referred to as clustered comparisons, and the latter two as non-clustered comparisons.

"Estimates" Chart:
These display estimated treatment effects, presented in standardized terms (i.e., in terms of standard deviations of the control group). All numbers are per capita, and flow numbers (consumption, income) are annualized. The preferred specification, identified in the paper, is highlighted through a black (as opposed to a hollow) marker.

"p values" Chart:
Specifications and treatment effects are ordered in ascending order of p values. The preferred specification is again highlighted.

Figure 1: Study Timeline



Note: All transfers were disbursed within two weeks of the marked date. Displayed survey dates exclude ones with suspected data entry errors.

Figure 2: Arms, Sub-Arms, and Participant Slots



Note: Data on underpowered research arms was collected for operational research only and is not included in the data set. Sub-arm C1 remains included, as it can serve to expand the sample size for controlled comparisons in villages outside of arm C.

Figure 3: Spatial Distribution by Arm



Note: Each axis corresponds to 0.9 degrees of lat- /longitude.

Figure 4: Model Selection



Notes:

- The first two columns define choices in the use of baseline data. **did** implies that outcomes are defined as differences in differences, i.e., that baseline data are subtracted from outcome data. **anc** implies an ANCOVA specification where the baseline value of the outcome serves as a covariate. A third choice applies when symbols in both columns are blank: in that case, baseline data is not used.

- Column **fe** defines if cluster fixed effects are used. This is only an option for so-called non-clustered comparisons.

- Column **cvt** defines if socioeconomic baseline characteristics are used as covariates. Where this is the case, the least angle regression algorithm proposed by Efron, Hastie, Johnstone and Tibshirani (2004) is applied to the applicable outcome and comparison group data model building purposes and selects five covariates from all those listed in Table 1. The selection process is repeated for each test.

- The preferred specification is defined as the one with the highest posterior probability, and is highlighted.

Figure 5: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Consumption



Figure 6: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Consumption



Figure 7: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Consumption



Figure 8: Impact of Savings Group Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Consumption



Figure 9: Impact of Behavioral Intervention Component (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Consumption



Figure 10: Impact of Spillovers on Consumption



Figure 11: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Assets



Figure 12: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Assets



Figure 13: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Assets



Figure 14: Impact of Savings Group Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Assets



Figure 15: Impact of Behavioral Intervention Component (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Assets



Figure 16: Impact of Spillovers on Assets



Figure 17: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Income



Figure 18: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Income



Figure 19: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Income



Figure 20: Impact of Savings Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Income



Figure 21: Impact of Behavioral Intervention (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Income



Figure 22: Impact of Spillovers on Income



Cash-Plus:
Tables

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Table 1: Baseline Covariate Balance

Baseline measure	Treatment sub-arms	Control sub-arms	p value	N
HH size	5.96	5.88	0.336	5,774
Age of HH Head	43.01	43.16	0.734	5,575
HH Head's years of schooling	5.32	5.32	0.949	4,586
HH Head is female	28.54%	28.52%	0.989	5,763
HH Head is monogamously married	56.79%	56.14%	0.622	5,763
HH Head is literate	46.69%	46.82%	0.922	5,763
HH has iron roof	26.49%	25.57%	0.432	5,774
HH has mud walls	39.92%	40.25%	0.798	5,774
HH has earth floor	96.78%	96.63%	0.761	5,774
HH has sanitary toilet / latrine	41.39%	40.49%	0.494	5,774
HH uses wood as main cooking fuel	98.61%	98.04%	0.102	5,774
HH uses electric light	2.04%	1.96%	0.819	5,774
HH owns its home	88.00%	87.61%	0.651	5,774
All HH members have two pairs of clothes	61.31%	61.76%	0.724	5,774
All HH members have a pair of shoes	23.39%	23.41%	0.987	5,774

Notes:

- The first three variables are continuous (representing averages) and the others are binary (representing proportions).
- p values pertain to coefficient β in model $X_{ijB} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where X_{ijB} is the variable in question for household i in cluster j during survey round B (i.e., baseline).
- Logistic regression is applied in the case of binary dependent variables.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2$\bigcup$D2$\bigcup$D3 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Standard errors are not adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 2: Participant Flow

Sub-arm	(1) Available Participant Slots				(2) Successful Baseline			
	Cohort #1	Cohort #2	Cohort #3	All	Cohort #1	Cohort #2	Cohort #3	All
A1	360	360	360	1,080	347	331	336	1,014
A2	420	420	420	1,260	404	384	391	1,179
B1	240	240	240	720	229	235	221	685
B2	280	280	280	840	266	265	260	791
C1	60	60	60	180	54	57	56	167
D1	168	168	168	504	156	155	152	463
D2	84	84	84	252	81	80	82	243
D3	84	84	84	252	78	81	78	237
E1	360	360	360	1,080	341	322	332	995
Total	2,056	2,056	2,056	6,168	1,956	1,910	1,908	5,774

Sub-arm	(3) Successful Midline					(4) Successful Endline				
	Cohort #1	Cohort #2	Cohort #3	All	Attrition[(i)]	Cohort #1	Cohort #2	Cohort #3	All	Attrition[(i)]
A1	316	302	321	939	7.40%	308	285	320	913	9.96%
A2	358	350	365	1,073	8.99%	354	335	370	1,059	10.18%
B1	215	219	211	645	5.84%	209	214	207	630	8.03%
B2	255	246	245	746	5.69%	249	230	245	724	8.47%
C1	43	54	53	150	10.18%	47	52	52	151	9.58%
D1	144	139	147	430	7.13%	138	136	145	419	9.50%
D2	78	78	78	234	3.70%	77	74	79	230	5.35%
D3	77	77	75	229	3.38%	75	72	76	223	5.91%
E1	314	304	315	933	6.23%	310	297	308	915	8.04%
Total	1,800	1,769	1,810	5,379	6.84%	1,767	1,695	1,802	5,264	8.83%

Note:

(i) Attrition is defined as the share of baseline survey participants for which the corresponding follow-up survey was unsuccessful.

Table 3: Test for Differential Attrition

First Follow-up

Comparison set	Treatment: Set of sub-arms	Surveyed	Attrited	Odds of Attrition	Control: Set of sub-arms	Surveyed	Attrited	Odds of Attrition	p value	
[a-i]	A2∪B2	1,819	151	0.083	A1∪B1∪C1∪D1∪E1	3,097	227	0.073	0.348	
[a-ii]	A2∪B2	1,819	151	0.083	A1∪B1	1,584	115	0.073	0.297	
[a-iii]	A2∪B2	1,819	151	0.083	E1	933	62	0.066	0.322	
[b-i]	D2∪D3	463	17	0.037	A1∪B1∪C1∪D1∪E1	3,097	227	0.073	0.020	**
[b-ii]	D2∪D3	463	17	0.037	D1	430	33	0.077	0.007	***
[b-iii]	D2∪D3	463	17	0.037	E1	933	62	0.066	0.092	*
[c]	A2∪B2	1,819	151	0.083	D2∪D3	463	17	0.037	0.010	**
[d]	A2	1,073	106	0.099	B2	746	45	0.060	0.027	**
[e]	D3	229	8	0.035	D2	234	9	0.038	0.846	
[f]	A1∪B1∪C1∪D1	2,164	165	0.076	E1	933	62	0.066	0.530	

Second Follow-up

Comparison set	Treatment: Set of sub-arms	Surveyed	Attrited	Odds of Attrition	Control: Set of sub-arms	Surveyed	Attrited	Odds of Attrition	p value	
[a-i]	A2∪B2	1,783	187	0.105	A1∪B1∪C1∪D1∪E1	3,028	296	0.098	0.530	
[a-ii]	A2∪B2	1,783	187	0.105	A1∪B1	1,543	156	0.101	0.747	
[a-iii]	A2∪B2	1,783	187	0.105	E1	915	80	0.087	0.332	
[b-i]	D2∪D3	453	27	0.060	A1∪B1∪C1∪D1∪E1	3,028	296	0.098	0.076	*
[b-ii]	D2∪D3	453	27	0.060	D1	419	44	0.105	0.068	*
[b-iii]	D2∪D3	453	27	0.060	E1	915	80	0.087	0.227	
[c]	A2∪B2	1,783	187	0.105	D2∪D3	453	27	0.060	0.057	*
[d]	A2	1,059	120	0.113	B2	724	67	0.093	0.340	
[e]	D3	223	14	0.063	D2	230	13	0.057	0.791	
[f]	A1∪B1∪C1∪D1	2,113	216	0.102	E1	915	80	0.087	0.386	

Notes:

- p values pertain to coefficient β in model $y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ij} defines attrition for household i in cluster j in the corresponsing comparison sets.
- Logistic regression is applied in all cases.
- Standard errors are adjusted for cluster robustness in so-called clustered comparisons [a-i], [a-iii], [b-i], [b-iii], [c], [d], and [f].

Table 4: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Poverty Indicators

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	27,526	18,859	26,061	20,189	10,570	16,343	13,980	18,826	14,300
Error	14,617	12,434	11,248	5,374	5,552	5,449	9,177	9,662	7,396
p value	0.062 *	0.132	0.022 **	0.000 ***	0.059 *	0.003 ***	0.130	0.053 *	0.055 *
q value	0.085 *	0.133	0.051 *	0.003 ***	0.085 *	0.021 **	0.133	0.085 *	0.085 *
N	4,750	4,655	4,906	4,750	3,598	3,796	3,901	3,815	4,021
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	28,334	15,898	25,180	13,134	8,182	10,584	-488	9,201	5,514
Error	12,875	10,088	9,381	3,092	2,954	2,657	4,228	3,820	3,401
p value	0.029 **	0.117	0.008 ***	0.000 ***	0.006 ***	0.000 ***	0.908	0.017 **	0.107
q value	0.061 *	0.133	0.029 **	0.002 ***	0.029 **	0.002 ***	0.435	0.043 **	0.127
N	4,750	4,655	4,906	4,750	3,718	4,906	3,796	4,801	3,916
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	-1,690	-1,411	-1,402	6,531	1,996	4,440	17,784	6,700	11,862
Error	2,056	2,377	1,917	2,510	2,936	2,452	5,477	5,381	4,361
p value	0.413	0.554	0.466	0.010 **	0.498	0.072 *	0.001 ***	0.215	0.007 ***
q value	0.247	0.263	0.247	0.033 **	0.249	0.091 *	0.013 **	0.160	0.029 **
N	4,916	4,811	5,073	3,901	3,695	3,901	3,796	4,655	3,916
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	1,393	4,638	2,839	506	1,905	1,238	-630	-2,217	-1,088
Error	3,260	2,443	2,605	701	707	572	2,416	3,622	2,681
p value	0.670	0.060 *	0.278	0.472	0.008 ***	0.032 **	0.795	0.542	0.686
q value	0.320	0.085 *	0.207	0.247	0.029 **	0.062 *	0.375	0.263	0.320
N	3,796	3,718	3,916	3,901	3,815	4,021	4,750	3,718	3,916

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly. Totals are not equal to the sum of sub-composites because they are winsorized and estimated separately. For further information on sensitivities, see corresponding specification curve figure.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons. The applicable model is defined as $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 5: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Poverty Indicators

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	-44,555	8,895	-17,141	19,336	15,720	15,852	-32,844	41,867	2,203
Error	22,843	21,614	19,679	8,804	9,795	8,397	15,953	17,511	13,579
p value	0.053 *	0.681	0.385	0.030 **	0.111	0.061 *	0.041 **	0.018 **	0.871
q value	0.102	0.622	0.467	0.079 *	0.173	0.109	0.091 *	0.065 *	0.773
N	3,446	3,372	3,545	3,446	2,625	2,773	2,840	2,764	2,916
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	-27,064	7,295	-10,261	15,695	13,343	15,155	2,456	19,948	11,042
Error	18,574	17,417	15,479	5,422	5,484	4,728	11,965	9,133	9,616
p value	0.147	0.676	0.508	0.004 ***	0.016 **	0.002 ***	0.838	0.031 **	0.253
q value	0.223	0.622	0.547	0.043 **	0.065 *	0.032 **	0.757	0.079 *	0.363
N	3,446	3,372	3,545	3,446	2,701	3,545	2,773	3,473	2,849
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	-10,963	-4,627	-7,690	1,352	3,223	2,172	-8,461	19,043	6,417
Error	3,320	3,407	2,819	4,260	5,224	4,416	8,605	7,713	6,881
p value	0.001 ***	0.177	0.007 ***	0.752	0.538	0.624	0.327	0.015 **	0.353
q value	0.032 **	0.260	0.049 **	0.695	0.547	0.622	0.454	0.065 *	0.461
N	3,560	3,481	3,661	2,840	2,688	2,840	2,773	3,372	2,849
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	-3,401	4,759	1,171	2,887	3,446	3,041	1,916	-4,182	-3,472
Error	4,683	5,234	4,352	1,106	1,475	1,059	4,634	6,167	4,784
p value	0.469	0.365	0.788	0.010 **	0.021 **	0.005 ***	0.680	0.499	0.469
q value	0.547	0.461	0.717	0.055 *	0.067 *	0.043 **	0.622	0.547	0.547
N	2,773	2,701	2,849	2,840	2,764	2,916	3,446	2,701	2,849

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly. Totals are not equal to the sum of sub-composites because they are winsorized and estimated separately. For further information on sensitivities, see corresponding specification curve figure.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons. The applicable model is defined as $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D2$\bigcup$D3 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 6: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Poverty Indicators

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	75,542	11,366	46,294	4,143	-7,577	-831	33,083	-18,670	7,275
Error	26,608	23,882	22,429	9,802	10,903	9,627	16,793	16,880	13,215
p value	0.006 ***	0.635	0.042 **	0.673	0.489	0.931	0.052 *	0.272	0.583
q value	0.123	1.000	0.236	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.262	1.000	1.000
N	2,188	2,145	2,263	1,763	1,727	1,819	2,278	2,232	2,354
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	61,321	11,378	38,623	-970	-5,046	-3,504	-4,846	-12,171	-6,997
Error	22,916	19,374	18,194	5,729	6,121	5,383	11,604	9,929	9,331
p value	0.009 ***	0.558	0.036 **	0.866	0.412	0.517	0.677	0.223	0.455
q value	0.123	1.000	0.236	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
N	2,188	2,145	2,263	1,763	1,735	1,823	2,278	2,232	2,354
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	9,392	3,094	6,039	2,944	-1,732	1,864	24,763	-11,150	6,927
Error	3,526	3,642	2,924	4,387	5,349	4,664	9,774	8,450	6,897
p value	0.009 ***	0.398	0.042 **	0.504	0.747	0.690	0.013 **	0.190	0.318
q value	0.123	1.000	0.236	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.123	0.948	1.000
N	2,282	2,236	2,358	2,282	1,727	1,819	1,763	2,236	1,879
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	3,510	-227	442	-1,495	-1,409	-1,749	-1,788	841	628
Error	5,010	5,274	4,546	1,154	1,538	1,087	5,114	5,629	4,445
p value	0.485	0.966	0.923	0.198	0.362	0.111	0.727	0.882	0.888
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.948	1.000	0.527	1.000	1.000	1.000
N	1,763	1,735	1,823	2,282	1,787	1,879	2,282	2,232	2,354

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly. Totals are not equal to the sum of sub-composites because they are winsorized and estimated separately. For further information on sensitivities, see corresponding specification curve figure.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons. The applicable model is defined as $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set D2$\bigcup$D3.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 7: Impact of Savings Group Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Poverty Indicators

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	8,166	16,343	8,833	-8,435	4,363	-5,917	45,958	-675	22,256
Error	28,971	22,433	21,944	11,109	8,289	9,048	17,386	16,300	12,882
p value	0.779	0.469	0.689	0.451	0.601	0.516	0.010 **	0.967	0.089 *
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.226	1.000	1.000
N	1,746	1,714	1,812	1,393	1,648	1,746	1,746	1,783	1,885
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	16,181	21,499	15,944	-2,082	-2,195	-2,438	11,061	-10,994	1,156
Error	25,909	17,803	18,221	5,895	4,514	4,900	7,574	7,733	6,017
p value	0.535	0.232	0.385	0.725	0.629	0.621	0.149	0.160	0.848
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
N	1,746	1,714	1,812	1,746	1,714	1,812	1,816	1,780	1,885
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	304	-2,914	-1,069	-5,582	-1,345	-3,794	20,025	18,574	20,169
Error	3,575	3,939	3,282	4,405	4,173	3,830	8,905	8,745	6,792
p value	0.933	0.462	0.746	0.210	0.748	0.326	0.028 **	0.038 **	0.004 ***
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.472	0.475	0.184
N	1,819	1,780	1,882	1,819	1,367	1,819	1,746	1,783	1,812
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	-754	-5,082	-4,145	590	1,402	996	1,915	-6,743	-2,198
Error	5,729	3,756	4,442	1,216	1,032	964	5,110	5,068	4,005
p value	0.896	0.181	0.355	0.629	0.180	0.306	0.709	0.188	0.585
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
N	1,393	1,714	1,445	1,746	1,783	1,812	1,393	1,714	1,812

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly. Totals are not equal to the sum of sub-composites because they are winsorized and estimated separately. For further information on sensitivities, see corresponding specification curve figure.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons. The applicable model is defined as $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2 and to the value one in set B2.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 8: Impact of Behavioral Intervention Component (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Poverty Indicators

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	-49,095	-2,876	-24,982	8,138	25,279	19,283	-31,923	25,279	-8,457
Error	33,085	37,211	29,279	12,660	13,863	11,479	20,811	32,534	21,376
p value	0.139	0.938	0.394	0.521	0.069 *	0.094 *	0.126	0.438	0.693
q value	0.381	1.000	0.779	0.825	0.304	0.374	0.381	0.779	0.825
N	462	431	451	462	442	462	462	431	472
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	-65,007	-5,563	-37,416	12,763	22,127	19,185	-13,534	31,106	8,155
Error	28,038	30,610	23,907	8,286	9,177	7,790	12,645	15,323	10,421
p value	0.021 **	0.856	0.118	0.124	0.016 **	0.014 **	0.285	0.043 **	0.434
q value	0.304	1.000	0.381	0.381	0.304	0.304	0.554	0.304	0.779
N	462	431	451	442	431	451	462	452	472
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	1,779	-7,125	-2,127	-779	938	163	-9,776	9,283	-7,411
Error	5,647	5,587	4,574	5,359	7,838	5,684	11,616	16,981	10,889
p value	0.753	0.203	0.642	0.884	0.905	0.977	0.401	0.585	0.496
q value	0.857	0.510	0.825	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.779	0.825	0.825
N	463	453	473	462	442	462	442	431	472
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	16,300	9,626	13,121	-743	3,063	1,101	-14,317	-3,668	-11,333
Error	8,114	7,724	6,407	1,624	2,344	1,661	7,720	7,299	5,581
p value	0.045 **	0.213	0.041 **	0.648	0.192	0.508	0.064 *	0.616	0.043 **
q value	0.304	0.510	0.304	0.825	0.510	0.825	0.304	0.825	0.304
N	442	452	473	462	453	473	462	452	472

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly. Totals are not equal to the sum of sub-composites because they are winsorized and estimated separately. For further information on sensitivities, see corresponding specification curve figure.

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called non-clustered comparisons. The applicable model is $y_{ijF} = \alpha_j + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, α_j defines cluster fixed effects; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.

- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D3 and to the value one in set D2.

Table 9: Impact of Spillovers on Poverty Indicators

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	-4,388	-33,799	-16,462	-3,940	-4,396	-3,640	-1,157	-22,780	-8,488
Error	22,784	19,963	18,915	6,923	7,608	6,789	13,113	14,130	11,813
p value	0.848	0.093 *	0.386	0.570	0.564	0.593	0.930	0.109	0.474
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
N	3,004	2,941	3,094	3,004	2,274	3,004	3,090	2,396	2,529
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	12,439	-14,277	1,169	-2,306	-2,505	-2,671	1,266	-11,212	-5,005
Error	17,296	14,327	13,429	3,955	4,219	3,846	6,996	6,281	6,093
p value	0.473	0.321	0.931	0.561	0.554	0.489	0.857	0.076 *	0.413
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
N	3,004	2,941	3,094	3,004	2,941	3,094	3,090	2,941	2,529
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	-2,803	-7,794	-5,188	1,947	106	917	577	-11,197	-5,648
Error	3,677	4,079	3,420	2,732	4,280	3,007	5,849	6,271	5,235
p value	0.447	0.058 *	0.132	0.477	0.980	0.761	0.922	0.076 *	0.283
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
N	3,097	3,028	3,188	2,461	2,328	2,461	3,090	3,021	3,181
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	-5,661	-6,297	-5,437	473	1,079	812	-1,382	3,327	800
Error	4,569	4,263	4,045	646	1,071	687	3,701	5,243	3,529
p value	0.217	0.142	0.181	0.466	0.315	0.240	0.709	0.527	0.821
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
N	2,403	2,342	2,471	3,090	2,396	2,529	3,004	2,396	3,094

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly. Totals are not equal to the sum of sub-composites because they are winsorized and estimated separately. For further information on sensitivities, see corresponding specification curve figure.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons. The applicable model is defined as $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1 and to the value one in set E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 10: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Psychological Indicators

Follow-up Round		First		Second		Pooled	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Well-being	Coefficient	0.028	0.028	0.095	0.142	0.079	0.140
	Error	0.035	0.039	0.035	0.044	0.036	0.041
	p value	0.430	0.466	0.007 ***	0.002 ***	0.029 **	0.001 ***
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.169	0.057 *	0.347	0.040 **
	N	4,899	3,152	4,803	2,454	5,070	2,588
Aspirations	Coefficient	0.031	0.037	0.004	0.012	0.014	0.021
	Error	0.031	0.035	0.029	0.033	0.030	0.033
	p value	0.314	0.300	0.901	0.724	0.626	0.520
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,809	3,825	4,550	3,640	5,048	4,004
Expectations	Coefficient	0.050	0.086	0.048	0.044	0.052	0.072
	Error	0.035	0.037	0.034	0.037	0.034	0.036
	p value	0.152	0.021 **	0.155	0.245	0.131	0.050 **
	q value	1.000	0.264	1.000	1.000	0.909	0.532
	N	4,771	3,799	4,478	3,580	5,041	3,998
Self-control	Coefficient	0.022	0.003	-0.007	0.024	0.013	0.017
	Error	0.041	0.042	0.044	0.044	0.047	0.042
	p value	0.595	0.950	0.871	0.597	0.790	0.695
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,913	2,538	4,811	2,487	5,073	2,616
Sense of Control	Coefficient	-0.007	-0.019	-0.034	-0.031	-0.023	-0.030
	Error	0.032	0.035	0.031	0.029	0.031	0.035
	p value	0.840	0.576	0.266	0.294	0.454	0.390
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,916	3,901	4,811	4,801	5,073	4,021
Sense of Status	Coefficient	0.065	0.102	0.126	0.128	0.120	0.143
	Error	0.033	0.035	0.027	0.030	0.030	0.033
	p value	0.050 **	0.004 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 ***
	q value	0.532	0.104	0.002 ***	0.004 ***	0.009 ***	0.004 ***
	N	4,761	3,749	4,811	3,777	5,061	3,973
Sense of Pride	Coefficient	0.004	0.008	0.025	0.037	0.023	0.029
	Error	0.039	0.030	0.047	0.034	0.047	0.031
	p value	0.920	0.790	0.598	0.280	0.624	0.349
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,916	4,916	4,811	4,811	5,073	5,073
Composite Index	Coefficient	0.064	0.106	0.080	0.129	0.078	0.143
	Error	0.042	0.045	0.041	0.044	0.043	0.042
	p value	0.133	0.021 **	0.055 *	0.004 ***	0.072 *	0.001 ***
	q value	0.909	0.264	0.559	0.111	0.683	0.040 **
	N	4,614	2,354	4,447	2,261	5,026	2,542

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.

- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.

- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 11: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Psychological Indicators

Follow-up Round		First		Second		Pooled	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Well-being	Coefficient	0.064	0.081	0.014	0.005	0.063	0.080
	Error	0.059	0.068	0.059	0.076	0.055	0.065
	p value	0.281	0.234	0.817	0.950	0.254	0.223
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,544	2,279	3,477	1,757	3,659	1,855
Aspirations	Coefficient	0.055	0.035	0.078	0.074	0.094	0.067
	Error	0.060	0.063	0.077	0.083	0.070	0.077
	p value	0.366	0.584	0.314	0.372	0.182	0.387
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,482	2,783	3,297	2,641	3,646	2,905
Expectations	Coefficient	0.103	0.106	-0.040	-0.078	0.047	0.018
	Error	0.069	0.070	0.050	0.057	0.061	0.062
	p value	0.134	0.133	0.432	0.168	0.443	0.769
	q value	0.909	0.909	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,449	2,761	3,247	2,596	3,640	2,900
Self-control	Coefficient	0.048	-0.022	-0.045	-0.036	0.025	-0.004
	Error	0.075	0.070	0.086	0.093	0.092	0.080
	p value	0.526	0.755	0.605	0.702	0.787	0.965
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,558	1,839	3,481	1,791	3,661	1,888
Sense of Control	Coefficient	-0.031	0.011	-0.090	-0.084	-0.077	-0.033
	Error	0.050	0.054	0.054	0.050	0.051	0.052
	p value	0.539	0.832	0.097 *	0.093 *	0.137	0.526
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.842	0.819	0.911	1.000
	N	3,560	2,840	3,481	3,473	3,661	2,916
Sense of Status	Coefficient	0.046	0.064	0.038	0.023	0.046	0.051
	Error	0.054	0.048	0.066	0.070	0.062	0.056
	p value	0.392	0.186	0.567	0.744	0.459	0.359
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,449	2,730	3,481	2,740	3,655	2,886
Sense of Pride	Coefficient	0.081	0.068	0.002	-0.006	0.071	0.052
	Error	0.066	0.050	0.088	0.061	0.088	0.057
	p value	0.222	0.171	0.979	0.921	0.424	0.358
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,560	3,560	3,481	3,481	3,661	3,661
Composite Index	Coefficient	0.128	0.174	-0.014	-0.030	0.074	0.107
	Error	0.078	0.066	0.085	0.077	0.091	0.067
	p value	0.104	0.010 ***	0.866	0.697	0.414	0.117
	q value	0.869	0.193	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.880
	N	3,340	1,698	3,226	1,619	3,635	1,822

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D2$\bigcup$D3 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 12: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Psychological Indicators

Follow-up Round		First		Second		Pooled	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Well-being	Coefficient	-0.035	-0.041	0.083	0.136	0.015	0.053
	Error	0.064	0.071	0.066	0.078	0.063	0.061
	p value	0.585	0.563	0.209	0.086 *	0.807	0.383
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.790	1.000	1.000
	N	2,275	1,409	2,232	1,149	2,357	1,462
Aspirations	Coefficient	-0.023	0.000	-0.065	-0.049	-0.074	-0.040
	Error	0.059	0.063	0.069	0.065	0.067	0.071
	p value	0.704	0.998	0.351	0.453	0.274	0.572
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,243	1,794	2,137	2,133	2,348	1,873
Expectations	Coefficient	-0.045	-0.029	0.103	0.138	0.005	0.040
	Error	0.065	0.066	0.065	0.070	0.070	0.070
	p value	0.491	0.659	0.116	0.053 *	0.947	0.575
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.880	0.549	1.000	1.000
	N	2,226	1,730	2,111	1,702	2,347	1,872
Self-control	Coefficient	-0.027	-0.024	0.036	0.058	-0.013	0.013
	Error	0.087	0.060	0.100	0.096	0.108	0.073
	p value	0.753	0.692	0.722	0.545	0.902	0.861
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,279	1,500	2,236	1,191	2,358	1,553
Sense of Control	Coefficient	0.026	0.018	0.053	0.057	0.056	0.043
	Error	0.058	0.058	0.055	0.051	0.055	0.054
	p value	0.652	0.760	0.337	0.269	0.316	0.431
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,282	2,278	2,236	2,145	2,358	2,354
Sense of Status	Coefficient	0.020	0.027	0.087	0.095	0.076	0.094
	Error	0.064	0.057	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.057
	p value	0.753	0.640	0.205	0.172	0.264	0.104
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.869
	N	2,210	1,700	2,236	1,771	2,352	1,859
Sense of Pride	Coefficient	-0.080	-0.061	0.023	0.041	-0.048	-0.012
	Error	0.081	0.057	0.107	0.075	0.107	0.066
	p value	0.326	0.287	0.829	0.587	0.652	0.854
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,282	2,278	2,236	2,232	2,358	2,354
Composite Index	Coefficient	-0.059	-0.079	0.102	0.170	0.005	0.033
	Error	0.088	0.061	0.097	0.081	0.100	0.071
	p value	0.499	0.197	0.293	0.039 **	0.959	0.644
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.459	1.000	1.000
	N	2,146	1,362	2,097	1,080	2,337	1,196

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.

- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set D2$\bigcup$D3.

- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 13: Impact of Savings Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Psychological Indicators

Follow-up Round		First		Second		Pooled	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Well-being	Coefficient	0.009	-0.026	-0.018	0.036	-0.021	-0.014
	Error	0.065	0.065	0.063	0.062	0.066	0.062
	p value	0.887	0.687	0.781	0.569	0.754	0.825
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,815	935	1,779	923	1,884	1,208
Aspirations	Coefficient	-0.064	-0.082	-0.097	-0.114	-0.104	-0.127
	Error	0.054	0.058	0.047	0.052	0.051	0.053
	p value	0.245	0.162	0.045 **	0.031 **	0.045 **	0.019 **
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.504	0.373	0.504	0.264
	N	1,785	1,418	1,695	1,361	1,875	1,486
Expectations	Coefficient	0.008	0.010	-0.052	-0.051	-0.035	-0.032
	Error	0.085	0.075	0.062	0.063	0.079	0.070
	p value	0.923	0.892	0.412	0.427	0.661	0.656
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,774	1,411	1,671	1,343	1,874	1,485
Self-control	Coefficient	-0.032	0.022	-0.008	0.009	-0.026	0.011
	Error	0.091	0.077	0.110	0.070	0.117	0.068
	p value	0.724	0.775	0.939	0.903	0.822	0.869
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,817	1,195	1,783	1,172	1,885	1,240
Sense of Control	Coefficient	0.058	-0.005	-0.080	-0.071	-0.016	-0.087
	Error	0.054	0.061	0.050	0.047	0.048	0.054
	p value	0.289	0.939	0.115	0.139	0.738	0.113
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.880	0.911	1.000	0.880
	N	1,819	1,393	1,783	1,714	1,885	1,445
Sense of Status	Coefficient	-0.028	-0.016	-0.026	-0.017	-0.044	-0.027
	Error	0.060	0.054	0.055	0.048	0.064	0.052
	p value	0.647	0.770	0.635	0.731	0.492	0.602
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,761	1,739	1,783	1,697	1,879	1,855
Sense of Pride	Coefficient	0.010	0.012	0.031	0.032	0.017	0.017
	Error	0.094	0.058	0.118	0.075	0.121	0.066
	p value	0.918	0.840	0.796	0.665	0.886	0.791
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,819	1,819	1,783	1,780	1,885	1,885
Composite Index	Coefficient	-0.027	0.029	-0.052	-0.081	-0.059	-0.060
	Error	0.100	0.068	0.095	0.066	0.104	0.066
	p value	0.788	0.667	0.585	0.226	0.571	0.375
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,710	1,084	1,659	1,051	1,864	1,184

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2 and to the value one in set B2.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 14: Impact of Behavioral Intervention (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Psychological Indicators

Follow-up Round		First		Second		Pooled	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Well-being	Coefficient	0.241	0.276	0.081	0.089	0.200	0.235
	Error	0.095	0.119	0.094	0.114	0.089	0.114
	p value	0.012 **	0.021 **	0.388	0.436	0.025 **	0.040 **
	q value	0.210	0.264	1.000	1.000	0.302	0.459
	N	460	282	453	276	473	290
Aspirations	Coefficient	-0.139	-0.135	-0.050	-0.049	-0.124	-0.092
	Error	0.078	0.086	0.092	0.089	0.081	0.077
	p value	0.074 *	0.118	0.585	0.581	0.126	0.233
	q value	0.683	0.880	1.000	1.000	0.909	1.000
	N	458	376	442	441	473	472
Expectations	Coefficient	-0.065	-0.024	0.292	0.327	0.084	0.137
	Error	0.087	0.084	0.124	0.125	0.096	0.093
	p value	0.456	0.778	0.019 **	0.009 ***	0.380	0.140
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.264	0.193	1.000	0.911
	N	452	452	440	439	473	473
Self-control	Coefficient	0.050	0.025	0.021	-0.082	0.049	0.034
	Error	0.096	0.117	0.098	0.114	0.095	0.112
	p value	0.599	0.830	0.829	0.476	0.608	0.765
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	462	297	453	239	473	252
Sense of Control	Coefficient	-0.051	-0.091	0.112	0.093	0.046	0.009
	Error	0.094	0.094	0.091	0.093	0.091	0.090
	p value	0.585	0.332	0.217	0.319	0.613	0.922
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	463	462	453	431	473	472
Sense of Status	Coefficient	0.126	0.100	0.057	0.057	0.091	0.098
	Error	0.095	0.095	0.097	0.099	0.095	0.100
	p value	0.182	0.292	0.556	0.569	0.338	0.325
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	449	426	453	367	473	377
Sense of Pride	Coefficient	0.317	0.320	0.147	0.156	0.275	0.302
	Error	0.100	0.096	0.097	0.088	0.098	0.088
	p value	0.002 ***	0.001 ***	0.131	0.079 *	0.005 ***	0.001 ***
	q value	0.055 *	0.040 **	0.909	0.713	0.123	0.040 **
	N	463	463	453	431	473	451
Composite Index	Coefficient	0.136	0.145	0.196	0.217	0.167	0.178
	Error	0.094	0.111	0.103	0.118	0.091	0.105
	p value	0.149	0.189	0.057 *	0.067 *	0.067 *	0.091 *
	q value	0.997	1.000	0.578	0.647	0.647	0.819
	N	436	278	438	265	473	289

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called non-clustered comparisons, which is $y_{ijF} = \alpha_j + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, α_j defines cluster fixed effects; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available); and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.

- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.

Table 15: Impact of Spillovers on Psychological Indicators

Follow-up Round		First		Second		Pooled	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Well-being	Coefficient	0.043	-0.041	-0.019	-0.089	0.019	-0.093
	Error	0.056	0.060	0.060	0.066	0.065	0.066
	p value	0.440	0.498	0.755	0.182	0.768	0.163
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,084	1,569	3,024	1,915	3,186	2,012
Aspirations	Coefficient	-0.084	-0.088	-0.047	-0.049	-0.082	-0.088
	Error	0.047	0.054	0.056	0.057	0.051	0.056
	p value	0.075 *	0.104	0.402	0.389	0.108	0.116
	q value	0.683	0.869	1.000	1.000	0.880	0.880
	N	3,024	2,407	2,855	2,279	3,173	2,518
Expectations	Coefficient	-0.110	-0.112	-0.081	-0.072	-0.116	-0.118
	Error	0.042	0.044	0.047	0.051	0.047	0.049
	p value	0.010 **	0.012 **	0.088 *	0.157	0.015 **	0.018 **
	q value	0.193	0.210	0.795	1.000	0.251	0.264
	N	2,997	2,388	2,807	2,237	3,167	2,513
Self-control	Coefficient	-0.047	-0.074	-0.031	-0.006	-0.040	-0.047
	Error	0.081	0.071	0.086	0.087	0.094	0.075
	p value	0.560	0.305	0.715	0.949	0.670	0.534
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,096	1,596	3,028	1,569	3,188	1,638
Sense of Control	Coefficient	-0.068	-0.049	0.042	0.041	-0.020	-0.017
	Error	0.049	0.053	0.055	0.050	0.053	0.050
	p value	0.164	0.362	0.441	0.409	0.710	0.734
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,097	2,461	3,028	3,021	3,188	3,181
Sense of Status	Coefficient	-0.049	-0.057	-0.022	-0.066	-0.053	-0.103
	Error	0.046	0.043	0.052	0.052	0.050	0.049
	p value	0.287	0.186	0.675	0.201	0.293	0.038 **
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.459
	N	3,000	2,962	3,028	2,373	3,182	2,500
Sense of Pride	Coefficient	-0.004	-0.001	0.006	0.009	0.006	0.007
	Error	0.077	0.050	0.103	0.066	0.104	0.059
	p value	0.960	0.992	0.956	0.895	0.957	0.909
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,097	3,097	3,028	3,028	3,188	3,188
Composite Index	Coefficient	-0.091	-0.129	-0.042	-0.034	-0.079	-0.126
	Error	0.070	0.068	0.084	0.065	0.083	0.053
	p value	0.195	0.060 *	0.616	0.598	0.345	0.019 **
	q value	1.000	0.597	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.264
	N	2,904	1,472	2,788	1,400	3,162	1,584

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1 and to the value one in set E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 16: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Nutrition

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Food Insecurity	Coefficient	-0.528	-0.936	-0.396	-0.495	-0.475	-0.719
	Error	0.363	0.222	0.280	0.189	0.302	0.178
	p value	0.148	0.000 ***	0.160	0.010 ***	0.118	0.000 ***
	q value	0.107	0.001 ***	0.107	0.023 **	0.104	0.001 ***
	N	4,916	3,901	4,811	3,815	5,073	4,021
Dietary Diversity	Coefficient	0.140	0.167	0.100	0.147	0.107	0.159
	Error	0.091	0.061	0.083	0.073	0.080	0.062
	p value	0.125	0.007 ***	0.230	0.046 **	0.185	0.011 **
	q value	0.104	0.023 **	0.131	0.057 *	0.113	0.023 **
	N	4,916	4,906	4,811	3,815	5,073	4,021

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 17: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Nutrition

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Food Insecurity	Coefficient	-0.014	0.132	-0.588	-0.130	-0.356	-0.046
	Error	0.584	0.357	0.543	0.362	0.522	0.302
	p value	0.981	0.712	0.281	0.720	0.497	0.879
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,560	2,840	3,481	2,764	3,661	2,916
Dietary Diversity	Coefficient	0.124	0.073	0.066	0.020	0.092	0.056
	Error	0.137	0.095	0.124	0.095	0.115	0.080
	p value	0.369	0.442	0.597	0.836	0.426	0.489
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,560	3,552	3,481	2,764	3,661	2,916

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D2$\bigcup$D3 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 18: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Nutrition

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Food Insecurity	Coefficient	-0.514	-0.739	0.192	-0.302	-0.120	-0.608
	Error	0.738	0.398	0.637	0.397	0.646	0.344
	p value	0.488	0.067 *	0.764	0.450	0.854	0.081 *
	q value	1.000	0.939	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.939
	N	2,282	2,282	2,236	1,787	2,358	1,879
Dietary Diversity	Coefficient	0.016	0.115	0.034	0.106	0.015	0.104
	Error	0.172	0.112	0.152	0.113	0.149	0.092
	p value	0.927	0.310	0.822	0.352	0.919	0.264
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,282	2,282	2,236	2,236	2,358	2,358

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set D2$\bigcup$D3.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 19: Impact of Savings Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Nutrition

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Food Insecurity	Coefficient	0.541	0.433	0.469	0.355	0.483	0.399
	Error	0.988	0.412	0.758	0.372	0.846	0.339
	p value	0.586	0.297	0.538	0.344	0.570	0.244
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,819	1,816	1,783	1,783	1,885	1,885
Dietary Diversity	Coefficient	0.060	0.069	0.100	0.107	0.048	0.054
	Error	0.238	0.116	0.192	0.116	0.210	0.107
	p value	0.801	0.554	0.605	0.360	0.820	0.614
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,819	1,819	1,783	1,783	1,885	1,885

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2 and to the value one in set B2.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 20: Impact of Behavioral Intervention (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Nutrition

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Food Insecurity	Coefficient	-0.889	-0.894	-0.482	-0.158	-0.669	-0.623
	Error	0.587	0.570	0.552	0.480	0.464	0.379
	p value	0.131	0.117	0.383	0.742	0.150	0.101
	q value	0.815	0.815	1.000	1.000	0.815	0.815
	N	463	379	453	453	473	473
Dietary Diversity	Coefficient	-0.140	-0.122	0.016	0.099	-0.070	-0.032
	Error	0.173	0.160	0.171	0.158	0.140	0.125
	p value	0.420	0.444	0.927	0.532	0.614	0.797
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	463	462	453	452	473	472

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called non-clustered comparisons, which is $y_{ijF} = \alpha_j + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, α_j defines cluster fixed effects; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.

- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.

Table 21: Impact of Spillovers on Nutrition

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Food Insecurity	Coefficient	-0.652	-0.629	0.135	0.144	-0.312	-0.279
	Error	0.703	0.324	0.596	0.327	0.623	0.283
	p value	0.356	0.054 *	0.821	0.661	0.617	0.326
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,097	3,090	3,028	3,021	3,188	3,181
Dietary Diversity	Coefficient	0.019	-0.025	-0.020	-0.033	0.009	-0.030
	Error	0.172	0.098	0.150	0.095	0.150	0.080
	p value	0.915	0.802	0.892	0.729	0.951	0.713
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,097	3,097	3,028	3,021	3,188	3,188

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.

- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1 and to the value one in set E1.

- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 22: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Employment Activity

Follow-up round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Active in Labor Force	Odds ratio	0.928	0.994	1.034	1.029
	Error	0.060	0.066	0.055	0.070
	p value	0.251	0.932	0.537	0.672
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	13,290	10,222	14,438	10,238
Active in Microenterprise	Odds ratio	0.978	1.076	1.055	1.070
	Error	0.071	0.078	0.055	0.081
	p value	0.763	0.309	0.311	0.367
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	13,297	8,287	14,464	8,290
Active as Employee or Day Laborer	Odds ratio	0.874	0.870	0.959	0.958
	Error	0.057	0.054	0.060	0.058
	p value	0.038 **	0.026 **	0.500	0.476
	q value	0.442	0.442	1.000	1.000
	N	13,309	10,248	14,478	8,292
Active in more than one Livelihood	Odds ratio	1.024	1.039	1.012	1.018
	Error	0.058	0.064	0.054	0.057
	p value	0.670	0.539	0.829	0.746
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	13,311	10,254	14,482	10,277

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Logistic regression is applied in all cases. As all outcomes are binary, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 23: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Employment Activity

Follow-up round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Active in Labor Force	Odds ratio	1.150	1.222	1.260	1.361
	Error	0.153	0.169	0.120	0.152
	p value	0.292	0.146	0.015 **	0.006 ***
	q value	0.502	0.264	0.051 *	0.028 **
	N	9,609	7,418	10,482	7,449
Active in Microenterprise	Odds ratio	1.278	1.317	1.402	1.550
	Error	0.151	0.157	0.122	0.194
	p value	0.038 **	0.021 **	0.000 ***	0.000 ***
	q value	0.075 *	0.057 *	0.002 ***	0.004 ***
	N	9,611	6,061	10,500	6,046
Active as Employee or Day Laborer	Odds ratio	0.945	1.011	0.999	1.033
	Error	0.124	0.127	0.140	0.127
	p value	0.666	0.933	0.994	0.793
	q value	0.999	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	9,619	7,434	10,514	6,053
Active in more than one Livelihood	Odds ratio	0.981	1.058	0.883	0.915
	Error	0.108	0.121	0.114	0.126
	p value	0.860	0.622	0.337	0.517
	q value	1.000	0.999	0.508	0.871
	N	9,621	7,436	10,517	7,478

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D2$\bigcup$D3 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Logistic regression is applied in all cases. As all outcomes are binary, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 24: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Employment Activity

Follow-up round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Active in Labor Force	Odds ratio	0.807	0.799	0.820	0.746
	Error	0.117	0.115	0.082	0.093
	p value	0.137	0.120	0.047 **	0.019 **
	q value	0.208	0.207	0.124	0.072 *
	N	6,273	4,838	6,742	4,775
Active in Microenterprise	Odds ratio	0.765	0.736	0.752	0.727
	Error	0.107	0.093	0.071	0.082
	p value	0.055 *	0.015 **	0.002 ***	0.005 ***
	q value	0.124	0.072 *	0.040 **	0.040 **
	N	6,278	4,839	6,748	4,779
Active as Employee or Day Laborer	Odds ratio	0.925	0.908	0.960	0.894
	Error	0.138	0.119	0.154	0.123
	p value	0.601	0.462	0.799	0.414
	q value	0.587	0.468	0.743	0.468
	N	6,286	4,089	6,754	4,993
Active in more than one Livelihood	Odds ratio	1.044	1.005	1.146	1.110
	Error	0.127	0.125	0.163	0.164
	p value	0.722	0.966	0.338	0.478
	q value	0.702	0.935	0.430	0.468
	N	6,286	4,852	6,751	4,787

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set D2$\bigcup$D3.
- Logistic regression is applied in all cases. As all outcomes are binary, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 25: Impact of Savings Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Employment Activity

Follow-up round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Active in Labor Force	Odds ratio	1.114	1.112	0.841	0.814
	Error	0.140	0.113	0.074	0.105
	p value	0.390	0.300	0.049 **	0.110
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.674	0.889
	N	4,977	3,081	5,349	3,782
Active in Microenterprise	Odds ratio	1.121	1.166	0.927	0.883
	Error	0.173	0.130	0.082	0.102
	p value	0.457	0.168	0.393	0.280
	q value	1.000	0.889	1.000	1.000
	N	4,982	3,826	5,356	3,946
Active as Employee or Day Laborer	Odds ratio	0.904	0.784	0.907	0.860
	Error	0.141	0.097	0.138	0.089
	p value	0.517	0.050 *	0.521	0.147
	q value	1.000	0.674	1.000	0.889
	N	4,988	3,089	5,359	3,788
Active in more than one Livelihood	Odds ratio	0.996	0.974	1.066	1.084
	Error	0.107	0.111	0.102	0.102
	p value	0.967	0.816	0.506	0.394
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,988	4,009	5,358	3,793

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2 and to the value one in set B2.
- Logistic regression is applied in all cases. As all outcomes are binary, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 26: Impact of Behavioral Intervention (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Employment Activity

Follow-up round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Active in Labor Force	Odds ratio	0.944	1.061	0.759	0.919
	Error	0.137	0.200	0.110	0.207
	p value	0.689	0.754	0.057 *	0.708
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,296	960	1,393	795
Active in Microenterprise	Odds ratio	0.991	1.034	0.829	0.995
	Error	0.123	0.160	0.102	0.180
	p value	0.942	0.829	0.128	0.980
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,296	1,055	1,392	837
Active as Employee or Day Laborer	Odds ratio	0.842	1.009	0.930	0.933
	Error	0.099	0.160	0.105	0.151
	p value	0.146	0.956	0.522	0.670
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,298	880	1,395	815
Active in more than one Livelihood	Odds ratio	0.848	0.975	0.815	0.893
	Error	0.108	0.144	0.098	0.137
	p value	0.194	0.863	0.090 *	0.461
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,298	1,060	1,393	994

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called non-clustered comparisons, which is $y_{ijF} = \alpha_j + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, α_j defines cluster fixed effects; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D3 and to the value one in set D2.
- Logistic regression is applied in all cases. As all outcomes are binary, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 27: Impact of Spillovers on Employment Activity

Follow-up round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Active in Labor Force	Odds ratio	1.021	1.098	1.117	1.108
	Error	0.102	0.113	0.092	0.101
	p value	0.834	0.363	0.180	0.261
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	8,313	6,401	9,089	6,456
Active in Microenterprise	Odds ratio	1.093	1.163	1.064	1.035
	Error	0.139	0.128	0.090	0.096
	p value	0.484	0.173	0.460	0.710
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	8,315	6,405	9,108	6,470
Active as Employee or Day Laborer	Odds ratio	0.904	0.864	1.029	1.010
	Error	0.109	0.070	0.124	0.091
	p value	0.401	0.071 *	0.814	0.911
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	8,321	6,417	9,119	6,479
Active in more than one Livelihood	Odds ratio	1.070	1.085	0.984	1.004
	Error	0.111	0.109	0.085	0.093
	p value	0.514	0.414	0.853	0.965
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	8,323	6,419	9,124	6,484

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1 and to the value one in set E1.
- Logistic regression is applied in all cases. As all outcomes are binary, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 28: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Schooling

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Enrolled in and Attending School	Odds ratio	0.958	0.903	1.032	1.004
	Error	0.066	0.081	0.063	0.092
	p value	0.536	0.257	0.609	0.967
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	10,786	7,123	13,646	7,272
Repeated Year	Odds ratio	1.008	1.027	0.950	0.980
	Error	0.072	0.081	0.052	0.074
	p value	0.910	0.732	0.351	0.788
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	9,023	5,675	10,662	5,514
Days worked last Month	Coefficient	0.192	0.110	1.237	0.772
	Error	1.759	1.556	1.366	1.734
	p value	0.913	0.944	0.367	0.657
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	10,974	8,652	13,648	7,367
School Days Missed last Month	Coefficient	-0.055	-0.179	0.001	0.020
	Error	0.086	0.100	0.076	0.074
	p value	0.523	0.075 *	0.986	0.792
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	9,024	5,491	10,476	5,364

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Logistic regression is applied in the case of the first two outcomes, which are binary. Because of these outcomes, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 29: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Schooling

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Enrolled in and Attending School	Odds ratio	0.950	0.871	1.324	1.182
	Error	0.135	0.147	0.162	0.205
	p value	0.716	0.414	0.022 **	0.336
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.537	1.000
	N	7,760	5,097	9,818	5,212
Repeated Year	Odds ratio	0.959	0.977	0.878	0.882
	Error	0.104	0.105	0.090	0.107
	p value	0.697	0.830	0.202	0.300
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	6,497	4,081	7,710	3,971
Days worked last Month	Coefficient	-1.334	-1.139	0.498	-0.688
	Error	3.559	3.386	2.147	2.401
	p value	0.708	0.737	0.817	0.775
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	7,889	6,192	9,819	5,291
School Days Missed last Month	Coefficient	-0.095	-0.179	-0.227	-0.062
	Error	0.124	0.137	0.156	0.178
	p value	0.443	0.193	0.147	0.729
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	6,502	3,973	7,573	3,868

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D2$\bigcup$D3 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Logistic regression is applied in the case of the first two outcomes, which are binary. Because of these outcomes, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 30: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Schooling

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Enrolled in and Attending School	Odds ratio	1.009	1.054	0.779	0.846
	Error	0.159	0.187	0.104	0.159
	p value	0.952	0.767	0.062 *	0.373
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	5,058	3,237	6,312	3,380
Repeated Year	Odds ratio	1.052	1.052	1.082	1.137
	Error	0.128	0.118	0.121	0.148
	p value	0.679	0.649	0.480	0.325
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,208	2,626	5,000	2,490
Days worked last Month	Coefficient	1.526	1.261	0.739	1.619
	Error	4.188	3.729	2.374	2.745
	p value	0.716	0.736	0.756	0.557
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	5,173	4,092	6,313	4,067
School Days Missed last Month	Coefficient	0.040	0.078	0.229	0.140
	Error	0.140	0.145	0.170	0.161
	p value	0.774	0.591	0.182	0.387
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,212	3,047	4,923	3,022

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set D2$\bigcup$D3.
- Logistic regression is applied in the case of the first two outcomes, which are binary. Because of these outcomes, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 31: Impact of Savings Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Schooling

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Enrolled in and Attending School	Odds ratio	1.001	1.095	0.959	0.953
	Error	0.132	0.160	0.108	0.170
	p value	0.994	0.536	0.713	0.788
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,042	3,285	5,070	2,720
Repeated Year	Odds ratio	0.948	0.879	0.993	1.043
	Error	0.123	0.103	0.118	0.139
	p value	0.681	0.271	0.955	0.753
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,367	2,110	3,976	2,049
Days worked last Month	Coefficient	1.483	2.639	-0.708	-0.754
	Error	4.124	3.072	2.471	2.823
	p value	0.720	0.394	0.776	0.790
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,129	3,415	5,071	3,275
School Days Missed last Month	Coefficient	-0.107	-0.078	-0.195	-0.198
	Error	0.155	0.156	0.154	0.132
	p value	0.493	0.621	0.212	0.138
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,367	2,529	3,913	2,348

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2 and to the value one in set B2.
- Logistic regression is applied in the case of the first two outcomes, which are binary. Because of these outcomes, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 32: Impact of Behavioral Intervention (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Schooling

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Enrolled in and Attending School	Odds ratio	0.856	0.701	1.020	1.289
	Error	0.144	0.217	0.153	0.401
	p value	0.354	0.251	0.896	0.414
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,016	580	1,242	557
Repeated Year	Odds ratio	1.056	1.102	0.912	0.802
	Error	0.154	0.209	0.123	0.161
	p value	0.710	0.607	0.494	0.273
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	841	616	1,024	605
Days worked last Month	Coefficient	-5.173	-4.556	-0.860	0.298
	Error	2.744	2.835	2.309	3.308
	p value	0.060 *	0.108	0.710	0.928
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,044	816	1,242	666
School Days Missed last Month	Coefficient	-0.103	0.136	-0.202	-0.192
	Error	0.184	0.222	0.151	0.202
	p value	0.576	0.540	0.181	0.342
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	845	600	1,010	603

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called non-clustered comparisons, which is $y_{ijF} = \alpha_j + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, α_j defines cluster fixed effects; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D3 and to the value one in set D2.
- Logistic regression is applied in the case of the first two outcomes, which are binary. Because of these outcomes, no pooled follow-up round is created.

Table 33: Impact of Spillovers on Schooling

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Enrolled in and Attending School	Odds ratio	0.981	0.916	1.016	1.055
	Error	0.097	0.122	0.107	0.144
	p value	0.849	0.513	0.881	0.697
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	6,744	4,437	8,576	4,552
Repeated Year	Odds ratio	1.046	1.053	0.952	0.913
	Error	0.121	0.117	0.097	0.104
	p value	0.698	0.639	0.627	0.425
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	5,656	4,141	6,686	3,405
Days worked last Month	Coefficient	-1.578	-0.473	2.066	3.737
	Error	3.441	2.678	2.219	2.340
	p value	0.647	0.860	0.353	0.112
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	6,845	5,376	8,577	4,609
School Days Missed last Month	Coefficient	0.149	0.206	0.122	0.133
	Error	0.153	0.149	0.125	0.111
	p value	0.332	0.168	0.330	0.234
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	5,657	4,119	6,563	3,315

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for individual i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1 and to the value one in set E1.
- Logistic regression is applied in the case of the first two outcomes, which are binary. Because of these outcomes, no pooled follow-up round is created.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 34: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Financial Position

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Savings	Coefficient	1,903	1,860	1,652	1,914	1,830	1,889
	Error	483	509	658	661	500	508
	p value	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.013 **	0.004 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 ***
	q value	0.006 ***	0.006 ***	0.066 *	0.030 **	0.006 ***	0.006 ***
	N	4,916	3,901	4,811	3,815	5,073	4,021
Loans	Coefficient	1,370	1,148	-9	-61	645	517
	Error	531	543	465	513	432	448
	p value	0.011 **	0.036 **	0.984	0.905	0.137	0.250
	q value	0.059 *	0.123	0.670	0.632	0.229	0.322
	N	4,916	3,901	4,811	3,815	5,073	4,021

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons. The applicable model is defined as $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 35: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Financial Position

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Savings	Coefficient	1,431	1,499	2,227	2,392	1,811	1,887
	Error	1,190	1,090	1,504	1,451	1,208	1,085
	p value	0.231	0.171	0.141	0.101	0.136	0.084 *
	q value	0.301	0.265	0.229	0.198	0.229	0.180
	N	3,560	2,840	3,481	2,764	3,661	2,916
Loans	Coefficient	-1,170	-2,013	-821	-1,369	-939	-1,648
	Error	529	543	618	670	485	491
	p value	0.029 **	0.000 ***	0.186	0.043 **	0.055 *	0.001 ***
	q value	0.114	0.006 ***	0.268	0.137	0.148	0.009 ***
	N	3,560	2,840	3,481	2,764	3,661	2,916

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons. The applicable model is defined as $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D2$\bigcup$D3 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 36: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Financial Position

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Savings	Coefficient	472	728	-575	-351	20	402
	Error	1,284	1,042	1,668	1,452	1,321	1,014
	p value	0.714	0.486	0.731	0.809	0.988	0.693
	q value	0.620	0.546	0.620	0.629	0.670	0.620
	N	2,282	2,278	2,236	1,787	2,358	2,354
Loans	Coefficient	2,540	2,379	812	833	1,584	1,603
	Error	697	660	661	621	583	546
	p value	0.000 ***	0.001 ***	0.222	0.183	0.008 ***	0.004 ***
	q value	0.006 ***	0.006 ***	0.300	0.268	0.046 **	0.030 **
	N	2,282	2,278	2,236	2,145	2,358	2,354

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons. The applicable model is defined as $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set D2$\bigcup$D3.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 37: Impact of Savings Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Financial Position

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Savings	Coefficient	67	124	885	1,019	421	497
	Error	1,082	944	1,414	1,123	1,150	896
	p value	0.951	0.896	0.534	0.368	0.716	0.581
	q value	0.666	0.632	0.546	0.437	0.620	0.577
	N	1,819	1,746	1,783	1,783	1,885	1,812
Loans	Coefficient	294	409	-288	-86	-5	144
	Error	1,106	944	771	687	844	716
	p value	0.791	0.667	0.710	0.901	0.995	0.841
	q value	0.629	0.620	0.620	0.632	0.670	0.632
	N	1,819	1,819	1,783	1,783	1,885	1,885

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons. The applicable model is defined as $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2 and to the value one in set B2.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 38: Impact of Behavioral Intervention (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Financial Position

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Savings	Coefficient	-2,838	-2,670	829	1,294	-1,089	-871
	Error	1,488	1,449	2,130	2,055	1,502	1,443
	p value	0.057 *	0.066 *	0.697	0.529	0.469	0.547
	q value	0.148	0.157	0.620	0.546	0.543	0.546
	N	463	462	453	452	473	472
Loans	Coefficient	-1,784	-1,923	-1,509	-1,662	-1,665	-1,937
	Error	844	814	1,209	1,156	884	830
	p value	0.035 **	0.019 **	0.213	0.151	0.060 *	0.020 **
	q value	0.123	0.086 *	0.297	0.236	0.150	0.086 *
	N	463	463	453	452	473	472

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called non-clustered comparisons. The applicable model is $y_{ijF} = \alpha_j + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, α_j defines cluster fixed effects; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D3 and to the value one in set D2.

Table 39: Impact of Spillovers on Financial Position

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Savings	Coefficient	-381	-839	-787	-913	-510	-876
	Error	749	655	1,057	977	831	719
	p value	0.612	0.202	0.458	0.352	0.541	0.225
	q value	0.597	0.288	0.540	0.426	0.546	0.300
	N	3,097	2,461	3,028	2,396	3,188	2,529
Loans	Coefficient	-1,124	-1,131	-1,895	-1,801	-1,464	-1,455
	Error	727	624	963	887	744	672
	p value	0.124	0.072 *	0.051 *	0.044 **	0.051 *	0.032 **
	q value	0.220	0.160	0.145	0.137	0.145	0.121
	N	3,097	3,090	3,028	3,021	3,188	3,181

Notes:

- All numbers are reported in current Ugandan Shillings per capita. Flow variables (consumption and income) are yearly. Totals are not equal to the sum of sub-composites because they are winsorized and estimated separately. For further information on sensitivities, see corresponding specification curve figure.
- Estimates pertain to coefficient β in the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons. The applicable model is defined as $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable; and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1 and to the value one in set E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 40: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Health Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Serious Illnesses	Coefficient	-0.011	-0.033	0.019	0.013	0.004	0.001
	Error	0.024	0.025	0.022	0.019	0.018	0.016
	p value	0.645	0.178	0.395	0.495	0.823	0.967
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	5,294	4,083	5,294	5,117	5,294	5,117
Clinic Visits	Coefficient	-0.016	-0.028	0.008	0.003	-0.010	-0.019
	Error	0.029	0.037	0.021	0.026	0.017	0.021
	p value	0.599	0.446	0.709	0.913	0.575	0.367
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,236	1,516	2,393	1,614	3,441	2,247
Child Deaths	Coefficient	-0.004	-0.007	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	Error	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.003
	p value	0.396	0.175	0.567	0.573	0.367	0.377
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,903	3,896	4,802	4,792	5,073	4,906
Preventative Clinic Visits for Children	Coefficient	-0.002	-0.011	-0.012	-0.024	-0.009	-0.018
	Error	0.015	0.014	0.015	0.013	0.013	0.011
	p value	0.876	0.431	0.419	0.068 *	0.493	0.103
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,916	4,750	4,811	4,655	5,073	4,906
Ideal Number of Children	Coefficient	-0.003	0.030	-0.016	0.037	-0.010	0.037
	Error	0.082	0.083	0.079	0.078	0.071	0.070
	p value	0.973	0.722	0.843	0.639	0.887	0.601
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,890	3,774	4,745	3,674	5,070	3,914
Pregnancies	Coefficient	0.011	0.010	0.015	0.013	0.014	0.013
	Error	0.012	0.012	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.009
	p value	0.373	0.424	0.156	0.231	0.104	0.124
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	4,916	4,750	4,802	4,646	5,072	4,905

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 41: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Health Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Serious Illnesses	Coefficient	0.060	0.044	0.042	0.040	0.051	0.050
	Error	0.044	0.046	0.043	0.036	0.035	0.031
	p value	0.179	0.338	0.331	0.272	0.151	0.115
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,804	2,959	3,804	3,679	3,804	3,679
Clinic Visits	Coefficient	0.018	0.057	0.021	0.009	0.022	0.022
	Error	0.045	0.058	0.043	0.044	0.035	0.041
	p value	0.684	0.328	0.630	0.829	0.524	0.592
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,627	1,067	1,725	1,148	2,478	1,594
Child Deaths	Coefficient	-0.010	-0.010	-0.005	-0.005	-0.007	-0.006
	Error	0.009	0.010	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
	p value	0.277	0.309	0.460	0.481	0.298	0.389
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,549	2,836	3,475	3,467	3,661	3,545
Preventative Clinic Visits for Children	Coefficient	-0.010	-0.012	-0.018	-0.018	-0.014	-0.014
	Error	0.026	0.026	0.024	0.021	0.021	0.020
	p value	0.703	0.653	0.461	0.398	0.512	0.474
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,560	3,446	3,481	3,372	3,661	3,545
Ideal Number of Children	Coefficient	-0.120	-0.054	0.017	0.036	-0.027	0.006
	Error	0.168	0.164	0.135	0.140	0.134	0.127
	p value	0.478	0.744	0.900	0.796	0.838	0.963
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,538	2,756	3,444	2,676	3,659	2,848
Pregnancies	Coefficient	0.002	0.007	0.008	0.009	0.004	0.006
	Error	0.017	0.016	0.024	0.025	0.014	0.013
	p value	0.902	0.661	0.736	0.704	0.769	0.620
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,560	3,446	3,475	3,366	3,660	3,544

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D2$\bigcup$D3 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 42: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Health Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Serious Illnesses	Coefficient	-0.071	-0.077	-0.023	-0.032	-0.047	-0.057
	Error	0.048	0.046	0.049	0.041	0.039	0.035
	p value	0.142	0.098 *	0.642	0.438	0.236	0.105
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,450	2,446	2,450	2,446	2,450	2,446
Clinic Visits	Coefficient	-0.034	-0.081	-0.013	-0.006	-0.032	-0.042
	Error	0.048	0.084	0.044	0.044	0.035	0.040
	p value	0.482	0.341	0.768	0.895	0.368	0.292
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,043	522	1,136	744	1,635	1,070
Child Deaths	Coefficient	0.006	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.003
	Error	0.010	0.010	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.007
	p value	0.549	0.636	0.731	0.603	0.584	0.693
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,278	2,278	2,231	1,731	2,358	2,263
Preventative Clinic Visits for Children	Coefficient	0.007	-0.002	0.006	-0.006	0.005	0.003
	Error	0.028	0.030	0.026	0.023	0.023	0.022
	p value	0.795	0.943	0.821	0.798	0.827	0.907
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,282	1,763	2,236	2,145	2,358	1,823
Ideal Number of Children	Coefficient	0.117	0.084	-0.033	-0.049	0.017	0.036
	Error	0.188	0.178	0.149	0.124	0.154	0.135
	p value	0.535	0.640	0.827	0.695	0.911	0.788
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,270	1,752	2,199	2,112	2,357	1,822
Pregnancies	Coefficient	0.009	0.008	0.007	0.023	0.010	0.018
	Error	0.019	0.019	0.025	0.024	0.015	0.015
	p value	0.652	0.654	0.796	0.346	0.506	0.243
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,282	2,278	2,233	1,785	2,358	1,879

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set D2$\bigcup$D3.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 43: Impact of Savings Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Health Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Serious Illnesses	Coefficient	-0.051	-0.048	0.012	0.020	-0.020	-0.014
	Error	0.045	0.041	0.051	0.038	0.041	0.031
	p value	0.259	0.249	0.819	0.592	0.633	0.654
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,970	1,896	1,970	1,896	1,970	1,896
Clinic Visits	Coefficient	-0.113	-0.154	-0.021	-0.018	-0.054	-0.071
	Error	0.046	0.072	0.039	0.044	0.028	0.042
	p value	0.017 **	0.036 **	0.587	0.694	0.065 *	0.093 *
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	826	425	902	605	1,299	648
Child Deaths	Coefficient	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005	-0.005
	Error	0.010	0.009	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.007
	p value	0.782	0.813	0.672	0.866	0.516	0.496
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,816	1,813	1,779	1,710	1,885	1,882
Preventative Clinic Visits for Children	Coefficient	-0.018	0.005	0.015	0.028	-0.001	0.017
	Error	0.029	0.024	0.026	0.023	0.023	0.019
	p value	0.541	0.838	0.577	0.235	0.952	0.396
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,819	1,746	1,783	1,714	1,885	1,812
Ideal Number of Children	Coefficient	0.223	0.254	0.146	0.130	0.174	0.182
	Error	0.171	0.129	0.167	0.115	0.161	0.106
	p value	0.198	0.052 *	0.385	0.263	0.283	0.091 *
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,811	1,738	1,750	1,685	1,884	1,811
Pregnancies	Coefficient	-0.005	-0.007	-0.002	0.000	-0.005	-0.003
	Error	0.020	0.021	0.020	0.019	0.018	0.018
	p value	0.820	0.737	0.928	0.979	0.771	0.866
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,819	1,816	1,780	1,711	1,885	1,812

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2 and to the value one in set B2.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 44: Impact of Behavioral Intervention (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Health Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Serious Illnesses	Coefficient	0.015	-0.034	0.022	0.038	0.018	0.026
	Error	0.072	0.080	0.060	0.066	0.048	0.046
	p value	0.839	0.669	0.709	0.564	0.697	0.571
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	480	393	480	393	480	479
Clinic Visits	Coefficient	0.035	0.009	0.090	0.095	0.070	0.050
	Error	0.101	0.192	0.063	0.118	0.060	0.109
	p value	0.726	0.962	0.151	0.421	0.244	0.643
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	217	121	234	110	336	157
Child Deaths	Coefficient	-0.017	-0.014	-0.008	-0.004	-0.014	-0.009
	Error	0.015	0.015	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.012
	p value	0.255	0.360	0.508	0.779	0.185	0.463
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	462	441	452	367	473	387
Preventative Clinic Visits for Children	Coefficient	-0.031	0.049	-0.018	0.020	-0.018	0.015
	Error	0.046	0.048	0.047	0.045	0.038	0.035
	p value	0.501	0.312	0.702	0.654	0.643	0.677
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	463	370	453	431	473	451
Ideal Number of Children	Coefficient	-0.236	-0.123	-0.391	-0.294	-0.304	-0.190
	Error	0.238	0.229	0.224	0.215	0.199	0.186
	p value	0.322	0.591	0.081 *	0.173	0.126	0.307
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	459	438	449	427	473	451
Pregnancies	Coefficient	0.011	0.009	-0.036	-0.037	-0.012	-0.013
	Error	0.030	0.029	0.044	0.044	0.025	0.025
	p value	0.711	0.757	0.407	0.400	0.622	0.617
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	463	462	453	452	473	472

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called non-clustered comparisons, which is $y_{ijF} = \alpha_j + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, α_j defines cluster fixed effects; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available); and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.

- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.

Table 45: Impact of Spillovers on Health Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Serious Illnesses	Coefficient	0.004	0.004	0.030	0.032	0.017	0.018
	Error	0.050	0.049	0.036	0.028	0.034	0.031
	p value	0.930	0.931	0.401	0.264	0.613	0.554
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,324	3,221	3,324	3,221	3,324	3,221
Clinic Visits	Coefficient	0.003	0.005	0.028	0.031	0.005	0.014
	Error	0.055	0.055	0.029	0.038	0.035	0.034
	p value	0.960	0.922	0.339	0.422	0.883	0.675
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,410	946	1,491	1,033	2,142	1,437
Child Deaths	Coefficient	0.006	0.014	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.011
	Error	0.008	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.005
	p value	0.479	0.055 *	0.459	0.459	0.323	0.032 **
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,087	2,457	3,023	3,016	3,188	2,529
Preventative Clinic Visits for Children	Coefficient	-0.021	-0.018	-0.032	-0.027	-0.028	-0.023
	Error	0.023	0.019	0.025	0.021	0.021	0.016
	p value	0.351	0.343	0.208	0.205	0.190	0.171
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,097	3,004	3,028	2,941	3,188	3,094
Ideal Number of Children	Coefficient	0.015	0.028	0.002	0.030	0.016	0.044
	Error	0.139	0.106	0.137	0.120	0.121	0.090
	p value	0.912	0.790	0.986	0.802	0.898	0.626
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,079	2,389	2,995	2,319	3,186	2,470
Pregnancies	Coefficient	-0.014	-0.012	0.010	0.013	-0.006	-0.004
	Error	0.016	0.015	0.014	0.014	0.012	0.011
	p value	0.387	0.441	0.472	0.327	0.617	0.747
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,097	3,004	3,022	2,935	3,187	3,093

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1 and to the value one in set E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 46: Impact of Microenterprise Programs on Community Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Sense of Community	Coefficient	0.055	0.071	0.053	0.032	0.055	0.071
	Error	0.027	0.030	0.030	0.033	0.027	0.030
	p value	0.046 **	0.018 **	0.078 *	0.343	0.046 **	0.018 **
	q value	0.309	0.309	0.338	0.783	0.309	0.309
	N	4,839	3,811	4,811	3,688	4,839	3,811
Sense of Trust	Coefficient	0.061	0.055	0.048	0.049	0.076	0.082
	Error	0.037	0.039	0.036	0.035	0.037	0.039
	p value	0.097 *	0.161	0.186	0.171	0.042 **	0.036 **
	q value	0.375	0.491	0.506	0.491	0.309	0.309
	N	4,912	3,794	4,796	4,786	5,073	4,021
Risk Sharing	Coefficient	-0.026	-0.029	0.030	0.021	-0.003	-0.009
	Error	0.044	0.041	0.045	0.032	0.047	0.036
	p value	0.557	0.477	0.509	0.508	0.947	0.811
	q value	0.880	0.842	0.842	0.842	1.000	1.000
	N	4,915	4,905	4,807	4,807	5,073	5,073
Empowerment of Women	Coefficient	-0.004	-0.005	0.021	0.026	0.002	0.004
	Error	0.030	0.031	0.032	0.032	0.031	0.031
	p value	0.888	0.872	0.522	0.415	0.949	0.907
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.842	0.842	1.000	1.000
	N	5,294	5,117	5,294	5,117	5,294	5,117
Safety from Intimate Partner Violence	Coefficient	0.020	0.025	-0.001	0.006	-0.002	0.007
	Error	0.037	0.036	0.038	0.039	0.035	0.035
	p value	0.580	0.487	0.974	0.886	0.946	0.844
	q value	0.883	0.842	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,195	3,086	3,034	2,560	3,677	3,551
Composite Index	Coefficient	0.048	0.046	0.060	0.080	0.054	0.088
	Error	0.039	0.041	0.041	0.042	0.037	0.041
	p value	0.225	0.267	0.144	0.059 *	0.156	0.032 **
	q value	0.578	0.692	0.491	0.309	0.491	0.309
	N	3,162	3,024	3,025	2,533	3,555	2,926

Table 47: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Community Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Sense of Community	Coefficient	-0.010	0.012	0.079	0.054	-0.010	0.012
	Error	0.054	0.043	0.054	0.058	0.054	0.043
	p value	0.850	0.789	0.149	0.352	0.850	0.789
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,497	2,766	3,481	2,679	3,497	2,766
Sense of Trust	Coefficient	0.057	0.048	-0.169	-0.176	-0.057	-0.047
	Error	0.054	0.050	0.059	0.060	0.053	0.051
	p value	0.290	0.337	0.005 ***	0.004 ***	0.285	0.357
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.091 *	0.091 *	1.000	1.000
	N	3,556	2,771	3,472	3,464	3,661	2,916
Risk Sharing	Coefficient	-0.035	-0.028	-0.021	-0.009	-0.023	-0.010
	Error	0.072	0.069	0.081	0.051	0.080	0.061
	p value	0.624	0.680	0.799	0.860	0.778	0.873
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,559	3,551	3,480	3,480	3,661	3,661
Empowerment of Women	Coefficient	-0.043	-0.033	-0.025	-0.015	-0.067	-0.052
	Error	0.057	0.055	0.054	0.051	0.053	0.048
	p value	0.452	0.550	0.651	0.770	0.205	0.283
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	3,804	3,679	3,804	3,679	3,804	3,679
Safety from Intimate Partner Violence	Coefficient	0.033	0.020	-0.001	0.000	0.028	0.013
	Error	0.073	0.068	0.058	0.069	0.061	0.062
	p value	0.657	0.769	0.983	0.996	0.645	0.839
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,326	2,254	2,212	1,867	2,669	2,580
Composite Index	Coefficient	-0.007	-0.024	-0.079	-0.086	-0.057	-0.025
	Error	0.076	0.076	0.064	0.066	0.060	0.061
	p value	0.930	0.752	0.218	0.192	0.341	0.681
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,300	2,206	2,205	1,847	2,579	2,131

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set D2$\bigcup$D3 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 48: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Community Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Sense of Community	Coefficient	0.068	0.089	-0.027	-0.022	0.068	0.089
	Error	0.063	0.055	0.060	0.061	0.063	0.055
	p value	0.284	0.110	0.658	0.722	0.284	0.110
	q value	1.000	0.534	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.534
	N	2,244	2,138	2,236	1,777	2,244	2,138
Sense of Trust	Coefficient	0.003	0.010	0.208	0.223	0.132	0.144
	Error	0.060	0.055	0.061	0.064	0.061	0.059
	p value	0.966	0.863	0.001 ***	0.001 ***	0.035 **	0.017 **
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.017 **	0.017 **	0.393	0.233
	N	2,282	1,763	2,230	2,139	2,358	1,823
Risk Sharing	Coefficient	0.009	-0.002	0.050	0.040	0.020	-0.002
	Error	0.086	0.079	0.094	0.055	0.097	0.068
	p value	0.913	0.980	0.597	0.468	0.840	0.972
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,282	2,278	2,233	2,229	2,358	2,354
Empowerment of Women	Coefficient	0.034	0.031	0.047	0.034	0.066	0.033
	Error	0.059	0.055	0.059	0.058	0.058	0.053
	p value	0.568	0.579	0.433	0.561	0.258	0.535
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	2,450	2,446	2,450	2,354	2,450	1,948
Safety from Intimate Partner Violence	Coefficient	-0.014	-0.014	-0.001	0.011	-0.034	-0.011
	Error	0.084	0.075	0.065	0.070	0.075	0.074
	p value	0.871	0.852	0.985	0.876	0.650	0.878
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,495	1,493	1,436	1,378	1,712	1,639
Composite Index	Coefficient	0.053	0.067	0.142	0.146	0.109	0.109
	Error	0.085	0.084	0.070	0.074	0.067	0.069
	p value	0.536	0.422	0.047 **	0.051 *	0.106	0.116
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.393	0.393	0.534	0.534
	N	1,478	1,402	1,434	1,253	1,648	1,363

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.

- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set D2$\bigcup$D3.

- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 49: Impact of Savings Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Community Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Sense of Community	Coefficient	0.050	0.049	0.031	0.029	0.050	0.049
	Error	0.061	0.055	0.052	0.044	0.061	0.055
	p value	0.423	0.371	0.561	0.512	0.423	0.371
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,793	1,780	1,783	1,768	1,793	1,780
Sense of Trust	Coefficient	0.035	0.029	0.050	0.046	0.050	0.042
	Error	0.074	0.071	0.060	0.062	0.074	0.073
	p value	0.636	0.682	0.416	0.463	0.506	0.562
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,819	1,746	1,777	1,708	1,885	1,812
Risk Sharing	Coefficient	0.031	0.032	0.028	0.023	0.037	0.036
	Error	0.103	0.089	0.115	0.062	0.121	0.074
	p value	0.765	0.723	0.811	0.714	0.761	0.627
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,819	1,816	1,780	1,780	1,885	1,882
Empowerment of Women	Coefficient	0.010	0.015	0.038	0.045	0.039	0.046
	Error	0.053	0.053	0.061	0.055	0.059	0.055
	p value	0.856	0.779	0.539	0.410	0.508	0.404
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	1,970	1,896	1,970	1,967	1,970	1,896
Safety from Intimate Partner Violence	Coefficient	0.192	0.191	0.097	0.120	0.155	0.147
	Error	0.072	0.064	0.064	0.068	0.065	0.069
	p value	0.010 **	0.004 ***	0.133	0.082 *	0.020 **	0.036 **
	q value	0.220	0.187	0.449	0.358	0.258	0.258
	N	1,182	1,131	1,129	957	1,360	1,131
Composite Index	Coefficient	0.162	0.187	0.107	0.115	0.149	0.165
	Error	0.085	0.086	0.070	0.070	0.072	0.074
	p value	0.061 *	0.034 **	0.130	0.107	0.043 **	0.030 **
	q value	0.286	0.258	0.449	0.431	0.264	0.258
	N	1,170	1,110	1,127	1,076	1,312	1,246

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called clustered comparisons, which uses model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available) and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.
- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2 and to the value one in set B2.
- Errors are adjusted for cluster robustness.

Table 50: Impact of Behavioral Intervention (Contingent on Cash Transfer Program Variant) on Community Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Sense of Community	Coefficient	-0.009	0.024	-0.210	-0.107	-0.009	0.024
	Error	0.095	0.105	0.099	0.109	0.095	0.105
	p value	0.929	0.816	0.035 **	0.328	0.929	0.816
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	451	359	453	367	451	359
Sense of Trust	Coefficient	0.035	0.067	-0.077	-0.122	0.006	-0.008
	Error	0.090	0.099	0.094	0.094	0.090	0.100
	p value	0.694	0.497	0.412	0.197	0.949	0.938
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	463	370	453	431	473	378
Risk Sharing	Coefficient	-0.116	-0.082	0.079	0.098	-0.010	-0.001
	Error	0.094	0.100	0.093	0.088	0.095	0.088
	p value	0.218	0.410	0.392	0.263	0.916	0.992
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	463	379	453	452	473	472
Empowerment of Women	Coefficient	-0.110	-0.115	0.054	-0.063	-0.025	-0.124
	Error	0.090	0.088	0.090	0.104	0.087	0.098
	p value	0.221	0.193	0.547	0.547	0.775	0.208
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	480	479	480	384	480	384
Safety from Intimate Partner Violence	Coefficient	-0.023	0.028	0.180	0.114	0.096	0.112
	Error	0.111	0.111	0.115	0.126	0.106	0.108
	p value	0.840	0.804	0.118	0.367	0.366	0.300
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	313	312	307	271	352	334
Composite Index	Coefficient	-0.107	-0.089	0.133	0.030	0.069	0.022
	Error	0.109	0.117	0.111	0.117	0.106	0.112
	p value	0.328	0.446	0.233	0.798	0.517	0.847
	q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	N	308	261	307	263	336	284

Notes:

- Estimates pertain to coefficient β. Specification 1 uses the model $y_{ijF} = \alpha + \beta T_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$, where y_{ijB} is the outcome in question for household i in cluster j during survey round F. Specification 2 applies the preferred specification for so-called non-clustered comparisons, which is $y_{ijF} = \alpha_j + \beta T_{ij} + \gamma y_{ijB} + \delta X_{ijB} + \varepsilon_{ij}$; here, α_j defines cluster fixed effects; y_{ijB} is the is the baseline value of the dependent variable (included only when available); and X_{pjB} is a set of five baseline covariates selected for each given test using least angle regression.

- Intent-to-treat assignment T is coded to the value zero among households in set A2$\bigcup$B2 and to the value one in set A1$\bigcup$B1$\bigcup$C1$\bigcup$D1$\bigcup$E1.

Table 51: Impact of Spillovers on Community Related Outcomes

Follow-up Round		First Follow-up		Second Follow-up		Pooled Follow-ups	
		Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2	Specification 1	Specification 2
Sense of Community	Coefficient	-0.017	-0.024	0.044	0.048	-0.017	-0.024
	Error	0.043	0.040	0.047	0.050	0.043	0.040
	p value	0.690	0.558	0.349	0.336	0.690	0.558
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.970	0.970	1.000	1.000
	N	3,046	3,014	3,028	2,372	3,046	3,014
Sense of Trust	Coefficient	0.076	0.079	0.040	0.038	0.077	0.082
	Error	0.058	0.057	0.047	0.046	0.054	0.053
	p value	0.189	0.166	0.401	0.404	0.162	0.127
	q value	0.939	0.939	1.000	1.000	0.939	0.939
	N	3,093	3,086	3,019	3,012	3,188	3,188
Risk Sharing	Coefficient	-0.001	0.001	0.084	0.120	0.047	0.044
	Error	0.081	0.078	0.089	0.056	0.096	0.073
	p value	0.986	0.995	0.346	0.035 **	0.626	0.544
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.970	0.690	1.000	1.000
	N	3,096	3,089	3,027	2,396	3,188	3,181
Empowerment of Women	Coefficient	0.114	0.128	-0.042	-0.038	0.042	0.056
	Error	0.044	0.056	0.043	0.047	0.044	0.045
	p value	0.011 **	0.024 **	0.322	0.419	0.342	0.209
	q value	0.661	0.690	0.970	1.000	0.970	0.939
	N	3,324	2,575	3,324	2,575	3,324	3,221
Safety from Intimate Partner Violence	Coefficient	0.034	0.027	0.076	0.057	0.050	0.037
	Error	0.058	0.053	0.053	0.053	0.052	0.049
	p value	0.556	0.607	0.160	0.284	0.338	0.458
	q value	1.000	1.000	0.939	0.970	0.970	1.000
	N	2,013	1,955	1,905	1,843	2,317	2,246
Composite Index	Coefficient	0.120	0.124	0.076	0.061	0.096	0.079
	Error	0.061	0.066	0.061	0.061	0.057	0.060
	p value	0.053 *	0.064 *	0.219	0.316	0.093 *	0.190
	q value	0.731	0.731	0.939	0.970	0.929	0.939
	N	1,992	1,914	1,898	1,819	2,243	2,150

Table 52: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Poverty Indicators: Upper Lee Bound

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	-30,840	22,276	-6,417	22,389	18,192	18,420	-24,823	48,881	9,715
Error	23,174	24,136	20,379	8,722	9,796	8,516	16,218	17,350	13,500
p value	0.185	0.358	0.753	0.011 **	0.065 *	0.032 **	0.128	0.006 ***	0.473
q value	0.316	0.514	0.683	0.033 **	0.121	0.073 *	0.214	0.029 **	0.514
N	3,431	3,357	3,529	3,432	2,617	2,762	2,827	2,754	2,902
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	-15,693	18,114	-1,316	17,722	14,350	16,677	8,178	25,315	14,816
Error	18,798	19,002	16,102	5,515	5,452	4,683	12,057	9,234	9,649
p value	0.405	0.342	0.935	0.002 ***	0.009 ***	0.001 ***	0.499	0.007 ***	0.127
q value	0.514	0.514	0.808	0.014 **	0.031 **	0.010 ***	0.514	0.029 **	0.214
N	3,433	3,357	3,529	3,433	2,692	3,531	2,760	3,458	2,838
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	-9,120	-2,959	-6,077	2,012	3,746	3,001	-6,350	21,662	8,278
Error	3,402	3,484	2,898	4,286	5,291	4,480	8,968	7,925	6,951
p value	0.008 ***	0.397	0.038 **	0.639	0.480	0.504	0.480	0.007 ***	0.236
q value	0.030 **	0.514	0.079 *	0.633	0.514	0.514	0.514	0.029 **	0.376
N	3,545	3,466	3,645	2,830	2,680	2,830	2,761	3,357	2,838
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	-1,017	6,780	3,482	3,934	4,832	3,845	3,193	-3,380	-2,434
Error	4,912	5,299	4,457	1,145	1,536	1,055	4,824	6,347	4,793
p value	0.836	0.203	0.436	0.001 ***	0.002 ***	0.000 ***	0.509	0.595	0.612
q value	0.755	0.330	0.514	0.010 ***	0.014 **	0.010 ***	0.514	0.621	0.621
N	2,761	2,689	2,836	2,830	2,753	2,907	3,431	2,690	2,838

Note:

- This table corresponds to Table 5, adjusted for attrition by trimming observations of treatment group D2⋃D3 so as to simulate the higher attrition rates experienced by counterfactual A1⋃B1⋃C1⋃D1⋃E1. The trimming procedure makes aggressive assumptions about the treatment effect at hand by trimming the lowest observations of the treatment group.

Table 53: Impact of Cash Transfer Programs on Poverty Indicators: Lower Lee Bound

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	-80,219	-32,494	-48,001	2,592	-2,569	287	-58,287	-7,807	-27,769
Error	21,216	18,479	17,043	7,312	7,075	7,044	13,527	14,951	11,710
p value	0.000 ***	0.081 *	0.006 ***	0.724	0.717	0.968	0.000 ***	0.602	0.019 **
q value	0.002 ***	0.089 *	0.014 **	0.377	0.377	0.538	0.001 ***	0.338	0.036 **
N	3,430	3,359	3,530	3,430	2,613	2,760	2,828	2,749	2,900
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	-57,068	-28,168	-36,301	5,404	3,453	5,166	-18,053	-5,919	-6,504
Error	16,975	14,453	14,342	4,712	3,886	3,664	8,320	7,250	6,704
p value	0.001 ***	0.053 *	0.012 **	0.253	0.376	0.161	0.032 **	0.416	0.334
q value	0.004 ***	0.075 *	0.027 **	0.189	0.277	0.140	0.052 *	0.287	0.251
N	3,431	3,359	3,530	3,430	2,689	3,528	2,760	3,457	2,833
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	-17,613	-11,785	-13,041	-6,369	-8,473	-5,407	-26,380	-2,210	-10,065
Error	3,071	2,810	2,668	3,332	4,547	3,745	6,509	6,542	5,632
p value	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.058 *	0.065 *	0.151	0.000 ***	0.736	0.076 *
q value	0.001 ***	0.001 ***	0.001 ***	0.077 *	0.081 *	0.140	0.001 ***	0.377	0.087 *
N	3,544	3,465	3,644	2,825	2,674	2,826	2,759	3,356	2,833
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	-11,052	-3,401	-7,622	408	-336	441	-9,438	-17,039	-12,515
Error	3,872	3,948	3,700	726	892	557	3,771	4,439	3,415
p value	0.005 ***	0.390	0.041 **	0.575	0.707	0.430	0.014 **	0.000 ***	0.000 ***
q value	0.014 **	0.278	0.061 *	0.337	0.377	0.287	0.027 **	0.001 ***	0.002 ***
N	2,762	2,690	2,833	2,825	2,750	2,901	3,430	2,687	2,835

Note:

- This table corresponds to Table 5, adjusted for attrition by trimming observations of treatment group D2⋃D3 so as to simulate the higher attrition rates experienced by counterfactual A1⋃B1⋃C1⋃D1⋃E1. The trimming procedure makes conservative assumptions about the treatment effect at hand by trimming the highest observations of the treatment group.

Table 54: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Poverty Indicators: Upper Lee Bound

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	118,312	58,310	79,796	20,326	15,246	16,065	64,434	38,189	36,799
Error	24,803	20,997	19,282	8,082	7,812	7,126	13,892	14,321	11,895
p value	0.000 ***	0.007 ***	0.000 ***	0.014 **	0.054 *	0.026 **	0.000 ***	0.009 ***	0.003 ***
q value	0.001 ***	0.006 ***	0.001 ***	0.009 ***	0.020 **	0.014 **	0.001 ***	0.008 ***	0.004 ***
N	2,168	2,129	2,334	1,803	1,711	2,168	2,262	1,769	2,334
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	96,051	51,110	67,326	9,658	6,576	5,444	20,411	19,467	11,279
Error	21,238	16,030	16,299	4,893	4,325	4,128	7,329	7,454	6,983
p value	0.000 ***	0.002 ***	0.000 ***	0.051 *	0.132	0.190	0.006 ***	0.010 **	0.110
q value	0.001 ***	0.003 ***	0.001 ***	0.020 **	0.036 **	0.046 **	0.006 ***	0.008 ***	0.031 **
N	2,258	2,129	2,246	2,169	2,127	2,244	2,169	1,771	2,338
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	17,643	11,509	12,501	11,069	10,887	8,972	43,492	12,199	20,536
Error	3,266	2,943	2,890	3,408	4,065	3,009	6,682	7,414	5,712
p value	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.002 ***	0.009 ***	0.004 ***	0.000 ***	0.103	0.001 ***
q value	0.001 ***	0.001 ***	0.001 ***	0.003 ***	0.008 ***	0.005 ***	0.001 ***	0.030 **	0.002 ***
N	2,262	2,217	2,338	2,262	2,141	2,262	2,258	2,217	2,338
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	14,514	9,926	8,008	537	2,865	1,553	14,901	14,168	9,702
Error	4,131	3,482	3,916	830	858	658	4,484	4,116	3,335
p value	0.001 ***	0.005 ***	0.044 **	0.520	0.001 ***	0.020 **	0.001 ***	0.001 ***	0.005 ***
q value	0.002 ***	0.006 ***	0.017 **	0.078 *	0.003 ***	0.011 **	0.003 ***	0.002 ***	0.005 ***
N	2,168	1,772	2,244	1,800	2,126	2,334	1,802	2,213	2,334

Note:

- This table corresponds to Table 6, adjusted for attrition by trimming observations of counterfactual group D2$\bigcup$D3 so as to simulate the higher attrition rates experienced by treatment group A2$\bigcup$B2. The trimming procedure makes aggressive assumptions about the treatment effect at hand by trimming the highest observations in the counterfactual group.

Table 55: Impact of Microenterprise Programs over Cash Transfer Programs on Poverty Indicators: Lower Lee Bound

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	58,881	-4,674	33,190	987	-10,597	-4,528	37,840	-28,510	-716
Error	26,974	25,996	23,372	9,886	10,908	9,798	17,531	16,667	13,092
p value	0.032 **	0.858	0.159	0.921	0.334	0.645	0.033 **	0.090 *	0.956
q value	0.315	1.000	0.416	1.000	0.780	1.000	0.315	0.318	1.000
N	2,169	2,127	2,244	1,750	1,717	1,804	1,803	2,214	2,335
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	47,973	-1,670	33,695	-2,662	-6,671	-5,098	-11,278	-16,966	-12,205
Error	23,031	20,740	20,064	5,906	6,158	5,391	11,809	9,987	9,324
p value	0.040 **	0.936	0.096 *	0.653	0.281	0.347	0.342	0.093 *	0.194
q value	0.315	1.000	0.318	1.000	0.731	0.780	0.780	0.318	0.450
N	2,171	2,127	1,806	1,748	1,722	1,809	2,259	2,214	2,335
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	7,104	1,090	4,070	1,848	-2,403	921	22,216	-14,513	4,574
Error	3,644	3,685	2,966	4,467	5,430	4,737	10,061	8,598	7,002
p value	0.054 *	0.768	0.173	0.680	0.659	0.846	0.030 **	0.095 *	0.515
q value	0.315	1.000	0.423	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.315	0.318	1.000
N	2,263	2,218	2,339	2,263	1,716	1,806	1,751	2,218	1,867
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	691	-2,590	-2,156	-3,008	-2,995	-2,736	-3,635	-239	-1,159
Error	5,211	5,337	4,640	1,151	1,527	1,084	5,218	5,776	4,397
p value	0.895	0.629	0.643	0.010 **	0.053 *	0.013 **	0.488	0.967	0.793
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.315	0.315	0.315	1.000	1.000	1.000
N	1,749	1,720	1,808	2,259	1,774	1,867	2,263	2,214	2,335

Note:

- This table corresponds to Table 6, adjusted for attrition by trimming observations of counterfactual group D2⋃D3 so as to simulate the higher attrition rates experienced by treatment group A2⋃B2. The trimming procedure makes conservative assumptions about the treatment effect at hand by trimming the lowest observations in the counterfactual group.

Table 56: Impact of Savings Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Poverty Indicators: Upper Lee Bound

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	56,116	48,706	42,847	5,255	15,178	10,448	72,692	25,190	38,132
Error	24,301	21,148	19,227	8,866	8,140	8,427	15,543	14,685	12,072
p value	0.024 **	0.025 **	0.030 **	0.556	0.067 *	0.220	0.000 ***	0.092 *	0.002 ***
q value	0.040 **	0.040 **	0.042 **	0.244	0.073 *	0.152	0.001 ***	0.086 *	0.010 ***
N	1,726	1,694	1,791	1,725	1,630	1,375	1,795	1,763	1,864
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	60,244	47,038	44,705	9,672	6,394	6,802	23,051	1,079	9,858
Error	20,193	16,124	15,356	5,073	3,548	4,390	6,669	6,205	5,410
p value	0.004 ***	0.005 ***	0.005 ***	0.061 *	0.077 *	0.127	0.001 ***	0.863	0.073 *
q value	0.013 **	0.013 **	0.013 **	0.070 *	0.075 *	0.112	0.006 ***	0.316	0.075 *
N	1,726	1,696	1,791	1,725	1,697	1,791	1,798	1,760	1,864
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	8,896	4,243	4,424	2,659	5,826	2,433	42,429	32,706	31,295
Error	3,072	3,646	2,959	3,581	3,569	3,262	8,879	7,383	6,144
p value	0.005 ***	0.249	0.140	0.461	0.108	0.459	0.000 ***	0.000 ***	0.000 ***
q value	0.013 **	0.152	0.120	0.222	0.098 *	0.222	0.001 ***	0.001 ***	0.001 ***
N	1,798	1,760	1,864	1,798	1,694	1,798	1,374	1,760	1,791
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	7,225	3,848	1,763	2,434	3,134	2,429	13,779	4,227	4,983
Error	5,366	3,414	4,022	1,093	963	887	3,750	4,310	3,498
p value	0.183	0.264	0.663	0.030 **	0.002 ***	0.008 ***	0.001 ***	0.331	0.160
q value	0.141	0.153	0.264	0.042 **	0.009 ***	0.017 **	0.004 ***	0.177	0.133
N	1,378	1,760	1,429	1,725	1,760	1,791	1,725	1,695	1,792

Note:

- This table corresponds to Table 7, adjusted for attrition by trimming observations of counterfactual group B2 so as to simulate the higher attrition rates experienced by treatment group A2. The trimming procedure makes aggressive assumptions about the treatment effect at hand by trimming the highest observations in the counterfactual group.

Table 57: Impact of Savings Component (Contingent on Microenterprise Program Variant) on Poverty Indicators: Lower Lee Bound

Follow-up Round	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled	First	Second	Pooled
	Total Consumption			Total Assets			Total Income		
Coefficient	-2,463	6,144	734	-12,957	542	-8,935	37,768	-5,395	17,030
Error	29,378	21,992	22,057	10,639	8,220	9,228	17,377	16,802	12,974
p value	0.933	0.781	0.974	0.228	0.948	0.337	0.034 **	0.749	0.194
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.812	1.000	1.000
N	1,727	1,695	1,793	1,374	1,629	1,726	1,726	1,764	1,865
	Food and Beverage Consumption			Livestock Assets			Income from Farming		
Coefficient	6,918	11,573	9,643	-3,225	-3,215	-4,017	5,327	-14,658	-2,204
Error	26,223	17,084	18,176	5,872	4,492	4,817	7,496	7,766	6,117
p value	0.793	0.501	0.598	0.585	0.477	0.408	0.480	0.064 *	0.720
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.812	1.000
N	1,727	1,761	1,792	1,726	1,695	1,792	1,796	1,761	1,865
	Recurring Consumption			Durable Assets			Income from Other Self-Employment		
Coefficient	-1,329	-4,352	-2,144	-6,613	-1,828	-4,645	18,366	17,397	18,378
Error	3,553	3,974	3,317	4,457	4,220	3,877	8,935	8,890	6,762
p value	0.710	0.278	0.521	0.143	0.666	0.236	0.044 **	0.055 *	0.009 ***
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.812	0.812	0.450
N	1,799	1,761	1,862	1,799	1,358	1,799	1,726	1,764	1,793
	Infrequent Consumption			Net Financial Position			Income from Paid Employment		
Coefficient	-2,234	-6,378	-5,312	-1,166	-184	-245	1,035	-7,586	-3,157
Error	5,821	3,811	4,477	1,012	1,027	912	5,087	5,079	4,085
p value	0.703	0.100 *	0.240	0.254	0.858	0.789	0.839	0.141	0.443
q value	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
N	1,379	1,695	1,433	1,726	1,761	1,862	1,375	1,695	1,792

Note:

- This table corresponds to Table 7, adjusted for attrition by trimming observations of counterfactual group B2 so as to simulate the higher attrition rates experienced by treatment group A2. The trimming procedure makes conservative assumptions about the treatment effect at hand by trimming the lowest observations in the counterfactual group.